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This thesis argues that the Internet is likely to be a strong, positive facilitating
factor for the transition to and consolidation of democracy for states in Southeast Asia.
U.S. policy makers intent on promoting democracy in Southeast Asia should consider the
Internet's potential as a tool for promoting democratization.
A review of the existing democratization literature, coupled with quantitative
analysis of the societal impact of computer networking technologies, suggests that the
level of Internet connectivity is a powerful indicator of democratization. Compared to
education and income, Internet connectivity provides greater statistical explanatory
power in predicting democracy.
The Internet experience in Indonesia and Malaysia, two Southeast Asian states
ruled by non-democratic authoritarian regimes, supports this argument. Internet
expansion in both states has co-varied with increasing levels of political liberalization and
this may enhance the prospects for democratic transition. Both states have abandoned
strict controls on press freedom and free speech on the Internet.
A democracy assistance program designed to increase the level of Internet
connectivity in Southeast Asia may serve the purpose of promoting democracy while also
advancing U.S. economic interests. Such a program may be viewed with less suspicion
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The Internet we make so much of today — the global Internet which has helped
scholars so much, whenfree speech isflourishing as never before in history—the internet was
a Cold War military project. It was designedforpurposes of military communication in a
United States devastated by a Soviet nuclear- strike. Originally, the Internet was a post-
apocalypse commandgrid.
And look at it now. No one really planned it this way. Its users made the
internet that way, because they had the courage to use the network to support their own
values, to bend the technology to their own purposes. To serve their own liberty. Their own
convenience, their own amusement, even their own idle pleasure. When I look at the
Internet—thatparagon ofcyberspace today—I see something astounding and delightful. It's
as ifsome grimfallout shelter had burst open and afull-scale Mardi Gras parade had come
out.
1
Bruce Sterling, die 1997 Hugo Award winning science fiction writer, made these
incisive remarks before the Convocation of Technology and Education of the National
Academy of Sciences in May 1993. In that year the Internet consisted of approximately one
million host computers in 50 countries around die world. Only four years later diere are now
over 20 million hosts located in 171 countries. Some estimates place the number of current
Internet users between 50 and 60 million people.2 To say that the Internet has exceeded the
growth estimates of its designers is to make the understatement of the decade.
That die Internet has "arrived" is without question. That it has expanded to reach
nearly every country on Earth is, in die timeline of cyberspace, ancient history. That its growdi
and popularity has gained a momentum all its own is obvious. That it is revolutioni2ing die
manner in which the world communicates is quickly becoming undeniable.
But the Internet phenomenon runs much deeper. It has become a subculture unto
itself, spawning its own unique vernacular and creating what even the mainstream press has
begun to refer to as "virtual communities." It has become much more than a forum for
1 Bruce Sterling "Literary Freeware — Not for Commercial Use" [on-line] (speech delivered at the Convocation on
Technology and Education, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 10 May 1993); available from
http://infosoc.uni-koeln.de/etext/text/gibson.93.txt; Internet, accessed 14 Oct. 1997.
2 Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes internet Timeline v3. 1 [on-line] (n. d); available
http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/I4istonr/HTT.htnil ; accessed 27 Oct. 1997; Joshua Oooper Ramo,
"The Networked Society," Time international, 3 Feb. 1997; available from The Electronic Library [database on-
line], http: / /www.elibrary.ccrm; no file identifier, Internet; accessed 17 Oct. 1997.
university bound technophiles or computer game playing adolescents. The Internet is
expanding well beyond its own electronic borders and is starting to impact significantly upon
the "real" world. These effects on society, on culture and on politics only now are beginning
to be realized. 3
We are told that we are witnessing the dawn of the "Information Age," a term that
somehow implies humanity has crossed a new threshold, entered a new epoch. Ignited in the
last century with the advent of the telegraph and the telephone, and enhanced in this century
with radios, satellites and undersea cables, momentum has grown. The melding of computers
with telecommunications in the 1980s and 1990s has brought about this "Information Age."
The Internet is the hallmark of this revolution. Unlike point to point communication
technologies such as the telephone, and broadcast technologies such as radio and television,
the Internet has overcome time as a limiting barrier to effective communication. It is
inherently asynchronous, allowing people to communicate with others independent of time
and place. And, more importantly, unlike the technological innovations that have preceded it,
the Internet has empowered ordinary people with tools to both gather and disseminate
massive amounts of information nearly instantaneously. No longer is the power of
information exchange and retrieval concentrated in hands of a privileged elite. But what will
be the impact of this new technology? How does one separate what is likely and what is
actually occurring from the hype?
Much has been written about the possibilities of Internet and like technologies. The
lion's share of such writing, however, is a strange mix of science fiction, technological idealism
and wishful thinking, long on conjecture yet short on facts and detailed analysis. This essay
takes a birds-eye view of one of the Internet's boldest claims to fame: that the Internet is a
strong, positive force in the promotion of democracy around the world.
3 For a detailed examination of die revolutionary nature of die Internet and its impact on society see Steven
Johnson, Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and Communicate (San Francisco:
Harper Edge, 1997), 64-65.
A. THE INTERNET AS A DRIVING SOCIAL FORCE
Throughout history, social revolutions on a grand scale have often resulted from
technological developments in the field of communication. Historians recognize the invention
of written language as a key event in human ascendance. The development and refinement of
sailing ships brought previously isolated civilizations into direct contact for the first time,
creating tremendous upheaval. And the invention of the printing press is credited with
emergence of the Enlightenment, scientific discovery, and nationalism, a force of unmatched
power in directing the social and political thoughts and actions of people in today's world.
Some argue that the Internet is one such innovation; a technology so unique, so
remarkable, that it will yield tremendous changes in the world's social and political landscape.
Michael and Rhonda Hauben argue in Neti^ens: The Expanding Commonwealth oflearning: 'Printing
and the Net, that the Internet is as much a revolution in Man's ability to communicate as was
the printing press.
4 Comparing the development and early use of the Internet today with the
development and early use of the printing press as described by Elizabeth Eisenstein in The
Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe, the Haubens point out the striking and comprehensive
parallels between the two innovations. The printing press, for instance, reversed the
"corruption of the copyists" wherein mistakes and distortions in texts created by the scribes
were compounded and multiplied over time. The press allowed mistakes to be corrected in
subsequent editions of a manuscript through feedback to the publisher, a practice encouraged
in the age of the press but non-existent in the age of scribes. A deeply ingrained "feedback"
loop is even more evident in much of the communication that occurs on the Net such as in
USENET news groups or on the World Wide Web. Other changes brought on by the
printing press that in many ways parallel changes brought on by the Internet include: enabling
long distance collaboration and cooperation, changing the way text is presented and cross-
referenced, encouraging cross-cultural exchange, and creating museums without walls. Many
of the unique facets of the printing press that are attributed to the large scale social changes
4 Michael Hauben and Ronda Hauben, Neti^ens: The Expanding Commonwealth ofLearning: Printing and the Net (Chapter
9) [book on-line] ([Los Alamitos, CA]: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1997); available
ftp:// rrpxsxolumbia.edu/pub/hauben/httrd/netbook/ch.9 pnnting.html ; Internet, accessed 12 July 1997.
that followed have been enhanced and expanded by the Internet in a quantum sense, unlike
any other communication innovation that has occurred in the intervening centuries.5
One of the primary benefits advanced by Internet supporters has been the Internet's
role in enabling and enhancing the prospects for democracy around the world. Detractors have
claimed the opposite, arguing that the Internet is in many ways an obstruction to democracy,
or at the very least, a force that will likely cause more social and political upheaval than it allays.
While the question of the Internet's democratizing potential has been openly discussed
within the Internet community, scholarly discourse in the field of political science, until only
very recently, has largely ignored the effects of the Information Age on political
transformation. It has, however, centered largely on discussions of "democracy." This is
understandable given the global explosion of democratization that has occurred in the last
decade. The debate has ranged from questions regarding the definition and features of
democracy to questions of the value of democracy and its ostensible worldwide suitability7 as a
system of government. Even when definitions are agreed upon, and it is conceded that
democracy is a desirable system of social and political organization, questions abound
regarding the factors that would likely facilitate a transition to and consolidation of democracy.
Given the extensive literature examining the emergence of democracy and factors that
contribute to democratization, it is surprising that few scholarly analyses of the Internet's
democratizing potential have been conducted. Clearly a comprehensive inquiry into the
potential impact of the Internet on the process of democratization is warranted, if for no other
reason than to evaluate the "grand" claims of its supporters. Such an examination should
necessarily include not only the theoretical aspects of the Internet's effects on democratization,
but should also examine the growing body of empirical data of the Internet in action in today's
world. The developing states of Southeast Asia provide ferule ground for the conduct of such
an inquiry.
Ibid.
B. WHY SOUTHEAST ASIA?
No region of the world is better suited to such an analysis than the countries of
Southeast Asia. Consisting of a few nascent democracies and a collection of states exhibiting a
mix of hard and soft-line authoritarian regimes, the states of Southeast Asia have experienced
phenomenal levels of economic growth over the last two decades. With booming economies
and an extraordinary explosion in telecommunications technologies, it is no wonder that the
Internet has caused some degree of controversy and promise in Southeast Asia.
Positioned on the economic development scale between the traditional "developing
world" (exemplified today by the majority of states in Sub-Saharan Africa) and the newly
industrialized states of East Asia (Korea and Taiwan for example), the robust developing states
of Southeast Asia are unique from any other region in the world. Choosing a self-labeled
"Asian model" of development, the leaders of several Southeast Asian countries have achieved
a large degree of success, building strong growing economies, significantly raising the median
standard of living, and creating an industrial base poised to take full advantage of future
technological developments.
Portions of Western culture have been assimilated into Southeast Asia wholesale, some
even to the point of co-option. The Western hunger for high-tech gadgets is a primary
example. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have all embraced Western technology
to the extent that a significant market share of the West's consumption of computers,
telecommunication equipment and consumer electronics is now manufactured in Southeast
Asia. Vietnam and the Philippines are actively seeking to join this growing club of high-tech
producers as well. U.S. and Japanese corporations are flocking to Southeast Asia in large
numbers, seeking to establish manufacturing and production facilities under favorable labor,
tax and legal conditions.
With this flow of Western technology firms and their manufacturing facilities comes
the Internet: the self-perceived masterpiece of U.S. technological dominance. And,
consequently, Southeast Asians are discovering that the Internet is more or less an all-or-
nothing proposition. It is difficult—if not possible—to absorb only those portions of the
Internet that are deemed desirable. With the good comes the bad. Hence the Internet's rapid
arrival in Southeast Asia is embroiled in controversy.
Democracy is controversial in Southeast Asia as well. Viewed against the backdrop of
the long and varied political history of the world, democracy has a short and relatively untested
history. Only in the Western world has any long-term experiment in democratic government
been attempted. In the last century, democracy has occasionally surfaced in Asia, generally
lasting only for a few years. Democracy, as a widely adopted form of government, has not
existed in Asia to any significant extent, hence the suspicion and doubt that it engenders in the
region, especially among the ruling elite, is somewhat understandable.
Some in Southeast Asia view democracy as simply another form of Western
imperialism; a cultural imperialism designed to destroy "Asian" society and to force Western
values upon populations that have no desire to adopt them. In this same context, some argue
that the Internet is at the forefront of this modem day colonization, forcing Western values
and culture upon people that have only recently rid themselves of their European (and
American) colonizers.6
C. CAN THE INTERNET PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA?
This thesis addresses each of the complex issues surrounding the Internet's spread
through Southeast Asia in order to investigate the Internet's potential as a democratizing force.
By examining the role of the Internet in Southeast Asia within the context of the wider
scholarly debate on democratization, conclusions regarding the Internet's democratizing
potential can be determined.
In the final analysis it is clear that the Internet will likely be a strong, positive
facilitating factor for the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Southeast Asia. U.S.
policy makers intent on promoting democracy in Southeast Asia, therefore, should seriously
consider the Internet's potential as a tool for promoting democratization.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Chapter II explores the potential for the
Internet to assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. Theoretical
b Alan Henderson, "Asia and the Internet Not Too Modem, Please," Econofmst, 16 Mar. 1996, available from The
Electronic Library [database on-line], http: / Avww.clibrary.coni: no file identifier, Internet, accessed 9 May
1997.
arguments—on both sides of the issue—are analyzed and available empirical evidence
weighed. Potential dangers to democracy posed by the Internet are considered.
Chapters III and IV focus on the Internet as it exists in Southeast Asia today, with
special emphasis on the social, political and cultural changes that it is bringing to the region.
Chapter III takes a broad view, examining the Internet across the region. Chapter IV zeroes in
on two countries, Malaysia and Indonesia, where the democratic potential of the Internet
appears most promising.
Chapter V presents a look at future prospects for the Internet in Southeast Asia, and
addresses the question of policy implications of this research for the United States in pursuing
its stated foreign policy goal of promoting democracy abroad.
D. DEFINITION, DESCRIPTION, HISTORYAND FEATURES OF THE
INTERNET
The "Internet" means different things to different people. To computer engineers and
systems professionals it often means the sum total of the infrastructure of the thousands of
computer networks that comprise it. To others it means the World Wide Web, a rich graphic
intensive behemoth consisting of millions of "websites," each as accessible as any other, each
distinct, and many consisting of hundreds of individual "webpages." To still others it means a
worldwide instantaneous mail system, a collection of thousands of individual news feeds, an
entirely new "virtual world," or some combination of all of the above. Because of its size,
scope and versatility, the Internet almost defies a single definition. And as with most complex
systems, the entire system consists ofmuch more than the sum total of all of its parts.
What then is the Internet? Gaining at least a basic understanding of this question is an
important pre-requisite to any discussion of the impact of the Internet on society. In an
elementary sense, the Internet is a giant network of interconnected computers that transfer
information using switched packets of data. The system incorporates a simple standard
common addressing system referred to as the Domain Name System (DNS) and a
communications protocol known as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP).7
The Internet is not controlled or operated by a central computer; its processing power
and organizational structure are distributed across thousands of connected computer networks
around the world. The Internet is specifically designed to be a decentralized network.
Although professional organizations such as the Internet Society (ISOC) and the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) issue specific technical standards, users make all other
decisions regarding the Internet. These decisions are not made through any organized
decision making process; they are made through the day-to-day actions of Internet users. The
Internet—in all of its complexity—is basically anarchical in nature. This total lack of
centralized control is a structural feature of the Internet and has as much to do with the
Internet's origins than with its evolution over time.
As previously noted by Bruce Sterling, the Internet has its roots in an advanced
military command and control system devised by the U.S. Defense Department's Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the late 1960's. ARPANET was specifically designed
to ensure the survivability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the event of a calamitous strategic
nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Computer networks before ARPANET were of the
master-slave variety with a single computer acting as controller for the entire network. Packet
switching was a breakthrough, establishing true peer-to-peer networking, where no single
computer controlled the network. This new design was well suited for military command and
control structures since loss of single or even multiple network nodes during wartime would
not adversely affect the remainder of the system,
8
In 1983 ARPANET was split into MILNET and ARPANET, and in 1990 ARPANET
was retired. The National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) assumed the network
7 Vinton Cerf, "How the Internet Came to Be," in The Online User's Encyclopedia, by Bernard Aboba [on-line]
([Reading, MAj.Addison-Wesley, 1993); available littp://w^-w.geoaties.com/SuiconVu11ey/2260/cern.litmh
Internet; accessed 8 Oct 1997.
8 Henry Edward Hardy, "The History of the Net" [on-line] (master's thesis, School of Communications, Grand
Valley State University, 1993); available http./Vwww.occan.ic.net/rtp/doc/ neniist.html ; Internet; accessed 8
Oct. 1997.
8
backbone role of ARPANET. NSFNET combined with the National Research and
Educational Network (NREN) to form what is known today as the Internet 9 Thousands of
other networks have been added since that time, exceeding more than 100,000 interconnected
networks by 1996, 10
The Internet has evolved into a diverse collection of independent (yet frequently
interconnected) modes of communication. The most prominent and widely used forms of
Internet communication include:
World Wide Web (WWW) - A graphics and text based environment that increasingly
incorporates multimedia (sound, video, etc.) as well as real-time interactivity. The Web
consists of millions of websites devoted to delivering an amazing breadth and depth of
information on nearly every topic. Resources available on the Web include those related to
entertainment, news, academic research, commerce, and politics to mention only a few.
E-mail - A text based communication method used for point-to-point, person-to-
person communication as well as multi-recipient broadcasting. An E-mail message sent by
one person is stored on the recipient's mail server computer until the recipient retrieves the
message. In addition to text, files, and graphics, a variety of multimedia can be transferred
using e-mail.
USENET News - A text based broadcast service organized into subject specific
newsgroups. Subscribers to a particular newsgroup receive all messages sent to the group.
LISTSEKV Mailing Lists - A hybrid communication method that delivers USENET
type subject specific newsgroups to recipients via E-mail.
Dozens of other communication methods proliferate on the Internet including
Internet telephone, video teleconferencing, text based chat, graphics rich chat environments,
multi-user virtual worlds (MUDs, MOOs, etc.), file transfer (FTP), Gopher, Archie, etc.
9 Ibid.
10 Zakon.
Classification of Internet communication modes is difficult. Traditional classification
schemes fail to capture the essence of the Net. Is the WWW broadcast or point-to-point
technology? What about e-mail? The answer to these questions is neither or both, depending
upon perspective. The overlapping, versatile nature of the Internet communication demands
that it not be considered in the same context as print, broadcast or point-to-point telephone
based media. The Internet is revolutionary in its methods as well as its size and scope.
10
II. INTERNET AS A DEMOCRATIZING FORCE
It the volume of scholarly literature on a particular issue is any measure of the relative
importance of that issue to society then the study of democratization in the 1990s must rank as
one of the most critical issues of our time, 11 Doh Chull Shin observes in a review of this
literature:
In terms of the sheer amount of attention from the scholarly community and
professional associations, the study of democracy and democratization has become a veritable
growth industry as witnessed by the recent sharp rise in the number ofprofessional conferences
andpublications on the subject. u
The field of political science and international relations has concentrated significant
energy on the study of how. why, and under what circumstances states and societies embark
on the transition to democracy. An inquiry into the potential democratizing effects of the
Internet must necessarily begin with an analysis of this large body of literature.
Democratization theorists have identified a number of key factors that are critically important
to the transition to and consolidation of democracy. Identifying each of these factors will
allow a detailed analysis ofhow the Internet impacts upon them.
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?
"Democracy" may have the dubious honor of being the most misused word in
political discourse. Politicians from across the political spectrum have championed it.
Particularly in today's world where democracy, as a form of government is all the rage, the
11 This study of transitions to democracy is, however, just a subset of the larger fieid of democratization studies.
An equal, if not greater, amount of research has examined questions regarding the value of democracy. A fierce
intellectual debate continues to rage regarding the merits of the "democratic peace," the idea that democracy is
a better form of government precisely because democracies do not go to war with each other. This debate has
senous implications for policy makers around the world, and the United States in particular. It is, however,
beyond the scope of this essay. Questions regarding the validity of the "democratic peace" are wide-ranging
and hotly contested. This paper will not attempt to discern the relative advantages or disadvantages of
democracy as a form of government; it will instead concentrate on the question of the Internet's potential role
in transitioning to and consolidating democracy. For a well-balanced presentation of this debate see Michael E.
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA The MIT
Press, 1996).
12 Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and
Research," Worid Politics Al (Oct. 1994): 138.
11
leader of any state would be remiss not to appropriate the word "democracy" to describe
themselves.
Consequently, until quite recently, scholars had generally avoided using this term
without proper qualification. 13 The literature of the third wave, however, has reversed this
trend. A general understanding of what is understood by "democracy" has emerged. This is
not to say that disagreement has ended over the scope of what is meant by "democracy," but
simply that the scholarly community has developed a general consensus on what are
considered the basic underlying principles of "democracy." Schmitter and Karl offer the
following definition:
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the
competition and cooperation oftheir elected representatives.
74
Key to this definition is the absence of any reference to specific institutions or
structures that are commonly associated with democracy. The institutions of democracy vary
greatly from state to state, and in this realm, there is significant disagreement and controversy
over which institutions best employ the concepts of democracy. Despite the specific form of
democracy (presidential, parliamentary, etc.) certain procedural concepts are common to all
democracies. Widely accepted by the broad community of social scientists, Robert Dahl lists
the following seven "procedural minimal" conditions that must exist for government to meet
the modem definition of democracy:
1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected
officials.
2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent andfairly conducted elections in which coercion is
comparatively uncommon.
3) 'Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election ofofficials.
4) Practically all adults have the right to runfor elective offices in thegovernment. . .
.
5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on
political matters broadly defined. . .
.
li Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is. . and Is Not/' in The Global Resurgence of




6) Citizens ham a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover,
alternative sources ofinformation exist and areprotected by Ian:
7) ...Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or
organi^itions, including independentpoliticalparties and interestgroups n
Schmitter and Karl argue that two additional conditions are necessary to distinguish
democracy from the those forms of government that may retain all of the appearances and
trappings of democracy but that fail to embody the basic concepts. These concepts are
"accountability of rulers to the people" and "self-governance." The first caveat is added to
exclude those governments in which actual political control is vested in the hands of the
military or some other unelected person or persons:
8) Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without
being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) oppositionfrom unelected officials.is
16
The second caveat excludes non-sovereign governments who are ultimately subject to
the rule of another state:
9) The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints
imposed, by some other owrarchingpolitical system.
17
The limiting nature of this "procedural minimal" definition of democracy may appear
overly restrictive. Such restrictions are relevant, however, due to the increasingly frequent
emergence of states that have fully adopted the basic form of democracy without achieving the
underlying principles. Thomas Carothers reports that:
In its annual surveys ofdemocracy and human rights, Freedom House hasfound in
recentyears that a growingpercentage of countries that are formally democratic are only partly
free—in other words, there are more and more countries that have succeeded in achieving the
basicform but not the actual substance ofdemocracy.
Examples of this trend are evident in Southeast Asia. Singapore, for example, is a self-
labeled democracy that fails to achieve a number of the underlying concepts. Singaporean law
severely restricts political expression that is critical of the government. Joseph Tamney argues
that:




Singapore is not a democracy, despite the holding of elections and the use of
democratic terms such as Parliament and prime minister. Democracy Asian-style in
Singapore is authoritarianism,
1V
Democracy is indeed a complex concept that does not allow a quick and easy
definition. Defining democracy requires an understanding of the basic concept it embodies,
and an understanding of the minimum procedures that must be in place to guarantee this
concept is met in practice. Democracy, at least as referenced in scholarly discourse, is not a
relativistic term that can be employed to fit desired circumstances—it refers to a very specific
set of principles that provide the basis for government.
B. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION - LESSONS OF
THE THIRD WAVE
Samuel P. Huntington has identified three distinct periods in world history that have
been characterized by waves of democratic transition. The most recent of these periods,
referred to as the "third wave" started in the mid 1970s with the fall of dictatorships in
Portugal, Spain and Greece, and exploded in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the
democratization of much of the former Soviet Union. This third wave continues to expand
democracy throughout the world today.
A significant result of recent research on this third wave has been the disaggregation of
the process of democratization into component parts. Four stages of democratization have
been identified: (1) decay of authoritarian rule, (2) transition, (3) consolidation, and (4) the
maturing of democratic political order. This same research has also concluded that
democratization is not necessarily a linear process proceeding from one stage to the next.
Democracies often fail before transition is even completed, or dissipate instead of
consolidate.
20
Clearly identifying democratization as a process consisting of a sequence of stages has
clarified much of the current debate, and has, in many ways, transformed the approach of
1B Ihomas Carothers, "Democracy," l'omgn Pokij (summer 1997): 11.




research efforts. Emphasis has clearly shifted from that of a search for prerequisites of
democracy to examinations of the dynamics of democratization as a process."
Recent study of democratization, then, has concentrated on the factors that have both
brought about and contributed to the successes (or failures) of this third wave. In a detailed
review of current research, Shin identifies a number of general propositions regarding
democratization
:
/. There arefewpreconditionsfor the emergence ofdemocracy.
2. No singlefactor is sufficient or necessary to the emergence ofdemocracy.
3. The emergence ofdemocracy in a country is the result ofa combination ofcauses.
4. The causes responsiblefor the emergence ofdemocracy are not the same as thosepromoting
its consolidation.
5. The combination ofcausespromoting democratic transition and consolidation variesfrom
country to country.
6. The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of democratization differs
from those responsible for other waves,
These propositions have established the context under which follow-on research has
been conducted. The critical result of much of this research has been the realization that
democratization is a complex process that is often subject to gross over-simplification. Factors
leading to democratization have varied over time and from country to country. No simple,
single answer exists for why any country has proceeded down the path of democratization.23
Specific facilitating factors, however, have been noted. Factors have been
conveniently grouped into two primary categories: domestic and international. In the domestic
sphere, Shin identifies three key factors that have facilitated the current wave of
democratization
.
The first factor involves a regime's perceived legitimacy. Shin argues that, "the most






regimes have lost legitimacy because they have failed to overcome the domestic problems
—
primarily economic—that enabled them to initially seize power. Others have lost legitimacy
because of a fundamental shift in values that has occurred precisely due to their economic
success. This shift of values from that of materialism to post-matenalism has been
characterized by increasing popular demands for political freedom and participation.
Unwilling to give in to such demands for fear of relinquishing power these regimes have been
unable to justify their continued existence.
The second factor consists of the depth of civil society within the state. Shin states
that, "the strengthening of civil society is the second domestic factor that has helped to
remove authoritarians from office."25 Civil society, a concept that has gained notoriety in the
United States due to its supposed decline, is the realm of public association and discourse
outside that of government and commerce. Voluntary and special interest organizations and
associations characterize civil society. Economic development, industrialization and
urbanization are forces said to have contributed positively to the rise of civil society so evident
in the third wave. Shin reports that:
£
Many of these organisations and associations, which Tocqueiille considered the
building blocks of democracy, became alternative sources ofinformation and communications.
They directly challenged authoritarian regimes by pursuing interests that conflicted with those
of the regime and eroded the capacity of authoritarian rulers to dominate and control their
societies,
6
The third and final domestic factor identified by Shin as having enhanced the
prospects for democratization is an increasing level of education and income of the masses.
At the individual level increasing education and expanding income have exposed
the masses to the virtues ofdemocratic civilisation. Those changes have also provided ordinary
citizens with the knowledge, skills, and spiritual incentives to pursue democratic reforms. In
short, the proliferation of autonomous associations and steady increases in the cognitive





The extensive body of democratization literature also points to factors originating
outside of the state, within the international political environment. Shin identifies two external
factors that have been key in bringing about the third wave:
Pressure from other countries and assistance provided by international organizations
have contributed to the democratization process. Countries such as the United States have
applied economic and diplomatic pressure to coerce authoritarian regimes to reform. Shin
argues that this pressure has weakened the regimes' "moral basis by encouraging people to
realize that democratization is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced
nations."" International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, have been
instrumental in the democratization process as well, providing "material and moral support for
the expansion of autonomous organizations and the news media."2y
The second international factor responsible for much of the third wave has been what
Samuel P. Huntington has coined as "snowballing". Shin explains:
Yet another international force has contributed a great deal to the collapse of
authoritarian rule (thefirstphase of democratization). This is international "snowballing,"
or the effects of diffusion. As vividly demonstrated in Eastern Europe and Latin America,
earlier transitions to democracy have served as modelsfor later transitions in other countries
within the same region
,
Although it is not apparent by the foregoing taxonomy, these factors, domestic and
international, are closely related and have often been intertwined. In some countries domestic
factors have taken precedence, in others international factors have had the largest effect. The
particular mix of each of these factors (along with many other factors) has varied for each state
that has democratized. Shin argues that "despite such differences, it is this confluence of








The democratization literature has identified one additional overriding principle, a
principle that has been evident in the first two waves of democratization as well as in the third.
Strategic elites, in both the political and social spheres of society, have had a much greater
effect upon the transition to democracv than have the masses. Shin states that:
As in the previous waves, strategic elites have been a key factor in bringing about a
majority of democratic transitions in the current wave. Especially in the transitions since the
early 1980s elites have played a jar more significant role than has the masses, tor this
reason, the literature does not consider the commitment oj the mass public to democracy an
absolute requirement for democratic transition. Indeed, it suggests that democracy can be
created even when a majority ofthe citizenry does not demand it.
This observation may at first appear antithetical to the basic concept of democracy. It
is. however, quite consistent, and with a great deal of empirical evidence. Mass participation is
important to democracy but only during the consolidation phase of the democratization
process. Shin explains:
It is only in the consolidation phase ofnew democracies that the mass publicplays a
key role. As in the past waves, it appears that democracy can still be created without the
demand oj masses, yet cannot be consolidated without their commitment. It seems then that
the role ofthe mass public in the process of democratization has changed little since thefirst
warn ofdemocratip'ation in the nineteenth century-.
These then are the central lessons to be learned from research that has been conducted
on the third wave.
C. INTERNET MEETS THE THIRD WAVE - THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Whatever the facilitating factors for democratization may have been for individual
countries of the third wave, technology has been a significant—if not crucial—underlying
factor. This point is voiced, albeit infrequendy, in democratization literature. In identifying
new forces that are "powerfully propelling the current wave," Shin identifies international






Such arguments aside, technology is infrequently discussed as a major facilitating factor
in the democratization process. If technology is specifically identified, it is usually only in an
incidental manner, and rarely as central to any theoretical arguments. This reluctance to
recognize the social and political transformative power of technology could be due to a lack of
specific research on the issue, or a belief among theorists that technology plays such a minor
or non-existent role that it does not even warrant discussion.
Another more likely cause, advanced by Walter Wnston, former chairman and CEO of
CitiCorp /Citibank, and Chairman of the Economic Policy Advisory Board in the Reagan
administration, is that diplomatic historians tend to "minimize or even ignore the impact of
scientific discoveries on the course of history, preferring instead to follow die great man theory
or look for the historical tides that carry the world along,"35 The near universal
characterization of the recent rise of democratization as the "third wave" lends credence to
Wriston's argument.
The argument that technology and the Internet are important social forces, however, is
by no means free from detractors. Richard E. Sclove, director of the Loka Institute's
Technology and Democracy Project outspoken Internet opponent, and author of Democracy
and Technology, laments what he sees as the "the persistent media hype about the Internet and
cyberspace. Even the recent spate of critiques that have begun to come out are publicized by
the mainstream media in hyped, self-serving ways. The hype is driven by the hope of profits
and strategic positioning."36 Clifford Stoll
5
author of Silicon Snake Oik Second Thoughts on the
Information Highway, agrees. Stoll contends throughout his book that the "Internet
phenomenon" is nothing more than self-serving hype designed to advance the cause of
computer and software developers at the expense of other more important aspects of society.
In addition to general criticism, claims of the Internet's potential to foster
democratization have also come under heavy fire. Does the Internet actually contribute to
55 Walter B. Wnston, "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy" foreign Affairs 76 (Sep./Uct. 1997): i 72-182
36 Richard E. Sclove, interview by Stephen L. Talbot, in "A Quick Guide to the Politics of Cyberspace," Netfuture,
[magazine on-line] 6 Feb. 1996; available
http: / /www.ora.com /people / staff/ s tevet/ netfuture / 19% / Feb0696 6.html#4 ; Internet; accessed 11 July 1997.
37 Oifford Stoll, Silicon Snake Oil Second Thoughts on the Information Highway (New York; Doubleday, 1995), passim.
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democratization or is this theory being advanced solely to further enrich American high-
technology stockholders? The following is a detailed two-fold examination of this question.
First this thesis considers the Internet as a potential facilitator of democratization in light of
the aforementioned conclusions drawn from the literature of the third wave, both in terms of
facilitating the transition to and the consolidation of democracy. Then available quantitative
data on the Internet's impact on society, and on democracy in particular, is examined. In the
final analysis it will become quite clear that the "Internet phenomenon" is much more than
hype; the Internet is indeed a strong, positive force for the facilitation of democratization
around the world.
1. Role of Internet in the Transition to Democracy
The Internet impacts upon authoritarian societies in striking ways, creating conditions
that may facilitate transitions to democracy. It weakens the power structure of authoritarian
regimes by eroding the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The Internet strengthens the second
building block toward democratic transition by expanding the resources available to civil
society. Newly created elites, particularly those in a position to successfully push for a
democratic transition, are those most empowered by the Internet. Finally, the Internet
exposes society to the global culture surrounding it, creating further incentives for
democratization
.
a) Declining Legitimacy ofAuthoritarian Rule
The literature of the third wave refers frequently to the idea of political
legitimacy. This term, depending upon context, suggests a number of different concepts. In
its classical sense, legitimacy implies the right or mandate for a leader to rule. The legitimacy
of kings and emperors was often based upon heredity; people accepted the authority of their
leader not because of coercion (although that was also often used) but because of a widely held
belief that the king was their rightful ruler. The legitimacy of a king was undermined when
questions arose regarding progression of royal family bloodline, not based upon his
performance.
Non-heredity-based ruling systems, such as many modem day authoritarian
regimes, however, have no such widely held belief on which to base their justification for
ruling the population. In many cases the legitimacy of such regimes is based almost entirely
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upon performance: economic, social or political. To the degree that they have a say, people
grant the authoritarian leadership of such regimes the mandate to rule only so long as they
believe that the regime is succeeding as a form of government. This is not to say that when a
majority of people believes that a regime is not performing well that it will be overthrown; on
the contrary, some regimes are able to maintain power through coercion even while
widespread disenchantment exists regarding their performance. Measures of legitimacy are
difficult. Popular disenchantment with a regime is one indication, but it certainly does not
suggest an imminent revolution, coup or political transformation. The level of political unrest
may be another indication, but this too has its limits as authoritarian regimes frequently use
coercion specifically to quell political dissent.
In the context of this discussion of the potential democratizing power of the
Internet, legitimacy is broadly defined to include popular dissent and disenchantment with
authoritarian rule—both in terms of the existing regime and in terms of the ideological
conception of authoritarianism as a legitimate form of government.
Authoritarian regimes have lost much of the domestic legitimacy they once
commanded. Two common paths to this loss of legitimacy have emerged. Primarily in
Eastern Europe and much of Latin America, authoritarian regimes have lost legitimacy
because they have failed to "solve economic and other problems that had allowed them to take
power in the first place."38 In Asia the reasons have generally been quite different. Regimes in
South Korea and Taiwan lost legitimacy because of their economic success. Rising income
and standards of living resulted in the expansion of a middle class that has called for greater
political freedom and participation. Legitimacy dissipated as these regimes refused to give in
to such demands.
These two paths are markedly different. In the former, it is unlikely that the
Internet or global communications technologies in general could have played a major role in
the regime's loss of legitimacy, except possibly that economic disaster was intensified by a
distinct lack of modem computer and communications technologies. This is primarily true
because the existence of Internet or other global communication network connectivity in such
38 Shin, 152.
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states was generally quite low. Without a state having previously experienced economic success
sufficient to have incorporated a global communications infrastructure on a large scale, it is
difficult to foresee a future instance where the Internet's role in such a path to democratization
would be anything but tangential.
But, in the case of the latter, the Internet or other global communications
technologies played a crucial role in many of these type of transitions, and, more importandy,
the potential for the Internet positively impacting on future transitions of this variety is high.
Economic success is said to have caused a portion of the population to demand increased
political freedom and participation that authoritarian regimes have refused to grant. Digging
deeper here, one must wonder, what brought about these demands in first place? Why did
people who, in most cases, had lived for centuries in a culture that demanded submission to
authority suddenly wakeup, as it were, to the recognition they deserved a degree of political
power and begin questioning the legitimacy of their own leaders. The refrigerators, microwave
ovens, and Levi's they purchased with their new found wealth provide no compelling reason
to believe that they have brought on this quantum change.
However, the radios, televisions, telephones, computers and satellite dishes
they purchased do. Demands for a greater stake in political and economic decisions occur
because these nouveau rich observe these values, through a wide variety of communication
'media, in the more developed—and democratic—world. They admire the ideals of political
freedom and then, when level of income and wealth allows, they imitate what they observe m
the developing world. Economic success by itself does not lead to demands for political
participation; sufficient wealth to easily satisfy basic needs coupled with a global system of
communication that openly promotes the worth of self-governance is what has produced this
marked change in values.
When discussing the impact of this global flow of information, Huntington has
argued that:
Increasingly exposed to the democratic alternative andjiriding it attractive,
masses become less willing to condone the continuation ofauthoritarian rule.
i9 Ibid., 169.
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Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, argues that these Internet linkages
have been a major factor in the democratic transitions that have occurred in the third wave:
The current, so-called third wave of democratization started in the mid-
1970s with the demise ofright-wing dictatorships in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, and in the
1980s it gathered momentum and spread. Technology was a majorfactor. Even the most
heavilyfortified borders became increasingly permeable to the onslaughtsfirst of radio, then of
television, and eventually offax machines and E-mail?
If the limited communication technologies of the past were instrumental in
bringing new ideas and new aspirations to those living under authoritarian rule, then there can
be little doubt that the greatly expanded capabilities of the Internet in delivering such
information will only serve to accelerate and strengthen the process.
Internet critics disagree. They contend that the Internet will serve only to
entrench the power base of authoritarian regimes. The incredible information retrieval and
storage technologies of the Internet, coupled with newly developed surveillance technologies
will enable authoritarian rulers to further persecute dissidents and minority groups. Sclove
argues that those in power, including the super-rich, will likely "retain vastly greater capabilities
to adopt powerful technology more quickly, to amass and analyze information, and, in many
cases, to act on it."
41
George Orwell would have revelled in this thought. The facts of the third
wave, however, have proven the technophobic premise of Nineteen Eighty-Four false. Francis
Fukuyama, in a recent review of the most influential books of the past 75 years said of
Orwell's classic:
Andjet, as Peter Huber has pointed out in his parody Orwell's Revenge
(1994), the 'telescreen' as described by Orwell is, technically speaking, nothing other than the
networkedpersonal computer. The wiring together ofa significantpart oftheplanetproved to
be a success that could not be controlled by centralized authoritarian states. Indeed, it turned




10 Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 75 (Nov./Dec. 1996): 50.
41 Sclove.
42 Francis Fukuyama, "Significant Books of the Last 75 Years: Political and Legal," review of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
by George Orwell, Foreign Affairs 76 (Sep./Oct. 1997): 214.
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And Wriston, speaking of the "third revolution" or the information revolution,
argues that
Information technology has demolished time and distance, instead of
validating Orwell's vision ofBig Brother watching the citizen, the third revolution enables the
citizen to watch Big Brother. And so the virus offreedom, for which there is no antidote, is
spread by electronic networks to thefour corners ofthe Earth.
43
Michael Bauwens echoes this view, arguing that Orwell was wrong because he
failed to foresee the bi-directional nature of the new media.44 Certainly governments can
attempt to apply technology to aid in repression and coercion, but the people can use this
technology for their own (often opposing) purposes as well. Orwell's vision only becomes
believable if government has a monopoly on technology. This point is critical because it is the
bi-directional versatility of the Internet (as opposed to other recent communication
innovations) that makes it so powerful and so revolutionary. The Internet removes control of
publication from the wealthy, the well connected and the ruling elite, and places it firmly in the
hands of anyone with access to a computer and modem.
b) Strengthening Civil Society
Democratization theorists are nearly unanimous in identifying "civil society" as
an important element of the transition to democracy. But what is this concept of civil society?
Democratization theorist Larry Diamond defines civil society as:
The realm oforganised social life that is voluntary, sefgenerating (largely)
self-supporting, autonomousjrom the state, and bound by a legal order or set ofshared rules.
It is distinctfrom society' in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public
sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual
goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an
intermediary entity, standing between theprivate sphere and the stated
Alan Wolfe concurs, adding that civil society is "those forms of communal and
associational life which are organized neither by the self-interest of the market nor by the
43 Wriston, 172.
44 Michel Bauwens, "On Internet Democracy vs. Information Poverty," Computer-Mediated Communication Magazine.
[magazine on-line] 1 Apr. 1996; available http:;Vwww.decembcr.com/cmc/mag/1996/apr/baudemo.html ;
Internet, accessed 16 Sep. 1997.
45 Larry Diamond, 'Toward Democratic Consolidation," in The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy. 2d ed., ed. Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 228.
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coercive potential of the state."46 The characteristics that civil society strives to develop, Wolfe
argues, are trust, cooperation, and altruism.
These definitions are broad and include social organizations and activities that
are clearly outside the sphere of civil society. Diamond adds four additional qualifications to
further limit the scope of civil society:
/. Civil society is concerned withpublic rather than private ends.
2. Civil society relates to the state in some way but does not aim to winformalpower
or office in the state, Rather, civil society organisations seek from the state concessions,
benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability. .
.
3. Civil society encompassespluralism and diversity. .
.
4. [Civil society assumes] partialness, signifying that no group in civil society seeks
to represent the whole of a person s or a community's interests. Rather, different groups
represent different interestsf
1
Civil society is often seen as an end in itself. There is, however, nothing
magical about it. Civil society works to facilitate democracy because it creates a public space, a
place absent the coercive power of the state and absent the anarchy of the market, where
people can associate with one another and communicate their needs, wants and desires in a
deliberative manner. This deliberative communication helps form the bonds of trust, altruism
and cooperation for which civil society is so revered. Then, through a multitude of
mechanisms, civil society both attempts to keep the state in check and to perpetuate the
democratic process.
The Internet enhances and builds upon civil society in two independent ways.
First the Internet creates a new and revolutionary—although markedly different—form of
public space where people congregate and participate in deliberative discourse much the same
as in traditional civil society. Second and more importantly, the Internet enhances traditional
civil society by empowering existing civil society organizations and associations, and by
contributing to the creation ofnew ones.
46 Alan Wolfe, "Is Qvil Society Obsolete? Revisiting Predictions of the Decline of Civil Society in Whose
Keeper?" The Brookings Review (journal on-line] 15 (fall 1997): 9-12; available
lnrp://mv-\v.brook.edii/P['B/Rl>:\ rlE\\7FALL97/AX'OLFE.H ,rNl : Internet; accessed 2 Oct. 1997.
47 Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," 229-230.
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(1) Cybercommunity
The claim that the Internet creates "virtual communities" that mirror
public space and civil discourse in the physical world is one of the most widely assailed
propositions of those advanced by Internet proponents. This proposition has been rejected at
face value by many because it seems unlikely given the popularly promoted media images of
"cyberculture," and appears to be directly contradicted by the widely accepted theory that a
serious decline in "social capital" has occurred in the United States over the last decade. This
decline, it is argued, is due, in large part, to the emergence of new technologies such as
television (and the Internet) that consume a significant portion of the average citizen's time,
time that would presumably be spent engaging in civil society or other social activities.
4
In a comprehensive essay on the Internet's impact on social networks,
Scott London argues:
Virtual communities are, more often than not,
pseudocommunities. They lack many of the essentialfeatures of real communities, such as
face-to-face conversation, the unplanned encounter—the chance meetings between people that
promote a sense of neighborliness and familiarity—and, perhaps most important, the
confrontation with people whose lifestyles and values differfromyours. In this sense, virtual
communities tend to be Utopian—they are communities of interest, education, tastes, beliefs,
and skills?9
London argues that virtual or "non-place" communities "tend to
exacerbate, rather than challenge the atomization and fragmentation of modem society," and
that they "give members a sense of belonging without any of the obligations of old-fashioned
communities."5 ' Further, London and others argue that discourse on the Internet is markedly
non-deliberative in nature and therefore contributes little if any to the democracy-enhancing
potential normally associated with civil society. Critics further contend that a sense of like-
mindedness exists on the Internet, where in the words of Stephen Doheny- Farina, "much of
the Net is a Byzantine amalgamation of fragmented, isolating, solipsistic enclaves of interest
48 Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal ofDemocracy (Jan. 1995): 70.
49 Scott London, "Civic Networks: Building Community on the Net" [on-line] (paper prepared for the Kertenng




based on a collectivity of assent."51 In cyberworlds, people choose their associations based
entirely upon personal interests. In physical communities, however, we are forced to associate
in one way or another with those within our same physical location, whether we share the
same interests with them or not. These viewpoints are widely shared in both the Internet and
the international relations/political science communities.52
Such critiques of Internet "cyber-communities" are critically flawed
because evidence of civil society on the Internet is not clearly distinguished from
commonplace conversation. It would be ludicrous to claim that all organizations, associations
and interpersonal communications that occur in society reflect civil society; or to simply select
at random an organization, association or discussion in search of civil society. Civil society, as
discussed in democratization literature and as credited with contributing positively to both the
transition to and consolidation of democracy, is clearly bounded. No claim is made that casual
conversations of everyday life constitute civil society. Yet when analyzing the Internet for the
possible existence of civil society, no such distinction is made. A spontaneous grouping of
teenagers conversing at a suburban shopping mall would not be mistaken for civil society. The
same grouping of teenagers chatting about the latest music video in one of the much maligned
America Online chatrooms on the Internet, however, is presented as evidence of the shallow,
non-deliberative nature of a medium that offers no senous contribution to civil society.
Even a cursory examination of the long-term, committed and faithful
community of individuals that read and submit to the "apakabar" e-mail mailing list (the largest
mailing list reporting news on Indonesia), for instance, or any one of thousands of serious
USENET or LISTSERV newsgroups for that matter, produces ample evidence of civil society:
groups of individuals engaged in voluntary, deliberative discourse relating to public issues.
The contention that associations on the Internet are formed on the
basis of a "collectivity of assent" that simply promote like-minded discussions and therefore
exclude dissent, prevent positive interaction with competing interests and viewpoints, and limit
51 Stephen Doheny-Faruia, The Wired Neighborhood (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1996), 55.
52 For the Internet perspective see Bruce Bimber, "The Internet and Political Transformation" [on-line] 23 Dec.
1996; available http: //www. ssct.ucsh.edu /~surveyl/poltran2.htm ; Internet, accessed 12 July 1997; and Sclove;
for the political science perspective, see: Claude Moisy, "Myths of the Global Information Village," foreign Policy
(summer 1997): 78-87.
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exposure to diversity is flawed in a similar manner. Associations in the physical world, as in
cyberspace, are often specifically structured around a single viewpoint, at the exclusion of
outsiders who may disagree. Atomization of society along narrowly aligned demographics,
issues, or views is not unique to cyberspace; nor is there any evidence to suggest that cyber
communities are in any way more atomized than society at large.
On the contrary, more so than traditional media, the Internet exposes
individuals to viewpoints that they may not otherwise have an opportunity to consider.
Putnam may be correct that technology has diminished civil society, but the Internet—because
of its unique characteristics—has achieved the opposite. Johnson observes that:
Most of the major innovations of the past hundredyears have
made itprogressively easier to avoid contact—andparticularly conversation—with people who
aren't colleagues, orfamily, orfriends. The automobile created the isolated cloisters of the
suburbs; the telephone and the television kept usfirmly implanted in our domestic spaces; even
thepublic life at the cinema unfolds now under a vow ofsilence.
The bi-directional, universal and anarchic nature of the Internet,
however, differentiates it from previous innovations. Johnson continues:
Instead of being a mediumfor shut-ins and introverts, the digital
computer turns out to be the first major technology of the twentieth century that brings
strangers closer together, rather thanpushing themfarther apart^
And as a medium for the honest and impartial reflection and
consideration of opposing viewpoints, the asynchronous—time independent—feature of a
large majority of Internet communications (e-mail, LISTSERV, USENET, and WWW) may
actually provide a more conducive environment for deliberative thinking and discourse than
the "decision on the spot" atmosphere often present in real world personal interactions.
Hauben and Hauben argue that:
The Net brings the isolated individual into contact with people,
opinions, and viewsfrom the rest ofthe world Exposure to many possible opinions gives the
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Social science research on the societal implications of the Internet is
sparse, and although this issue is addressed in more detail later, it is important to note here that
the most comprehensive study to date, a 1995 RAND study entitled Universal Access to E-mait
Feasibilty and Societal Implications, concluded that:
Prior studies
.
. . show little reason to be concerned that citizens will
abandon the needs of their local (physical) communities in favor of virtual communities in
cyberspace. Rather, communications are typically addressed to a community of concerned
individuals, and eitherfor reasons ofsubject matter orprior acquaintance, these concerns are
often (although not necessarily) geographically bounded. Thus, network access can be expected
to enhance rather than detractfrom community involvement!
6
The case for cybercommunities enhancing civil society by creating new
and unique "public spaces" for deliberative discourse that positively contributes to community
involvement is well established. That cyberspace does not seem to fit in the traditional mold
of "civil society" does not discount the fact that it can and indeed does produce many of the
same positive results.
(2) Physical Resources
The second and likely more effective manner in which the Internet
contributes to the rise of civil society is the positive impact that it has upon the real world
associations that comprise traditional civil society. The mechanisms for this contribution are
numerous and wide-ranging, hence only a few are addressed here, with the remainder
discussed in subsequent sections. Unlike the issue of cybercommunities, however, there is
much less disagreement that the Internet exerts a strong, positive force in enabling and
enhancing the activities of a wide variety of organizations and associations at the community,
state and global levels. Free and open bi-directional communication is enabled for these
groups both internally between members within the organization, and externally with other
individuals or organizations.
New public spaces are also emerging. "Cybercafes," for instance,
where inexpensive Internet access is made available to the general public are increasingly
emerging in the developing countries of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. These gathering places
56 Robert H. Anderson et aL, UniversalAccess to E-mait: Feasibility and Sodetallmplications [book on-line] (Santa
Monica- RAND, 1995); available http: / /www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR650 : Internet; accessed 12 July
1997.
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are quickly assuming an important role as centers for public discussion of key social and
political issues.
Even critics of the Internet's democratizing potential admit that it is
affecting the nature of discourse in the real world. London concedes that
On-line venues such as "chat rooms," mailing lists, and
newsgroups can go a long way toward disseminating new information and ideas, naming and
framing collective issues, andpromoting broad-based discussion:i
And Jessica Matthews, who criticizes worldwide Internet expansion as
a dangerous globalizing force (an issue analyzed in depth later in this thesis), argues that
through international networks the Internet is empowering local interest groups. Discussing
the recent rise in the size, scope and power of international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), Matthews identifies computer networking as the key variable in NGOs new found
success:
Technology isfundamental to NGOs ' new clout. The nonprofit
Associationfor Progressive Communications provides 50,000 NGOs in 133 countries access
to tens ofmillions ofInternet usersfor theprice ofa heal call The dramatically lowered costs
of international communications have altered NGOs' goals and changed international
outcomes.
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The effect of this new clout has been to educate, strengthen and
empower local interest groups. Matthews argues that a "circle of influence" often develops
between local NGOs and larger, more experienced global NGOs, the international media, and
the host governments of the global NGOs:
Cross-border NGO networks offer citizens [sic] groups
unprecedented channels ofinfluence. Women 's and human rights groups in many developing
countries have linked up with more experienced, betterfunded, and more powerfulgroups in
Europe and the United States. The latter work the global media and lobby their own
governments to pressure leaders in developing countries, creating a circle of influence that is
accelerating change in manyparts ofthe world
59
57 London.
58 Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs 76 (Jan./Feb. 1997): 54.
59 Ibid., 54.
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The Internet, then, is not the exclusive realm of computer game
playing adolescents, sheltered academics and techno-geek computerphiles as it is often
imagined and portrayed. The very organizations and associations that democratization
theorists point to as critical in bringing about an authoritarian regime's transition to democracy
can be empowered by the Internet. Important contributions to the rise and empowerment of
civil society in both developed and developing states can be realized through access to the
global Internet.
c) Empowerment ofElites
Internet critics point out that the Internet is not free; computer equipment,
communications links, and on-line access time all have a cost. And, unlike television that
simply requires the user turn it on, and newspapers which require a basic level of literacy, the
Internet, they argue, requires literacy and a degree of education in the use of computers. These
two factors, critics contend, place the Internet out of reach for the common person, creating
an "information elite" that will serve only to further stratify society along socio-economic,
ethnic and geographic fault lines.
In the context of the Internet's impact on established democracies, this
argument may reveal limitations of the Internet's effect on the consolidation of democracy, an
issue that is considered later in this paper. In terms of its impact upon potential authoritarian
transitions to democracy, however, this argument misses a key lesson of the third wave; mass
participation is not required for the transition to democracy. The third wave has clearly
demonstrated that mass movements calling for democratic transition are isolated exceptions.
Social, economic and political elites have been key instigators in the bulk of
democratic transitions in the last two decades. In each transition the specific makeup of the
groups that have formed pacts to bring about democratic change have differed. In the
transitions that have occurred in Asia, various groups of elites have engineered the transition
to democracy. In these states, decades of strong economic growth brought large increases in
real income and standards of living. This economic success contributed to the rise of a
middle class that became dissatisfied with authoritarian rule. Better educated than their
predecessors and armed with previously unheard of levels of disposable income, these newly
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created elites increasingly demanded political freedom and participation. Rejecting the
arbitrary nature of authoritarian rule, these elites embraced democratic reforms.
To the extent that the Internet creates an "information elite," it probably can
empower the middle and upper classes in society, groups from which the very elites that are in
the best position to bring about a democratic transition are members. Arming them with
information, creating peer networks for communication and organization, and establishing a
safe enclave—free from government control—for the growth and development of democratic
movements, the Internet contributes to the spread of such movements. Hauben and Hauben
argue that
Many groups which do not have a strong established form of
communications in society hai>e found the Net to be a powerful tool. It has proved fertile
groundforgroups which are notfirmly established in their local culture™
The creation of an "information elite" early in the democratization process can
contribute positively to undermining authoritarian rule and enabling a democratic transition.
The fact that the introduction of the Internet in developing nations does not occur equitably
across the socio-economic spectrum does not diminish the potential for democratization; on
the contrary, it may enhance it.
d) Globalization ofDemocracy
The remaining key factors identified in democratization literature as having
facilitated the third wave operate at a level external to the state. Pressure from external actors,
both states and NGOs, has contributed to the emergence of democracy. "Snowballing" or the
"democratic demonstration effect" has been a factor as well.
Economic and diplomatic pressure applied by external states is necessarily a
political decision, and therefore receives criticism for being more a feature of great power
hegemony than a program to expand democracy.61 That controversy aside, the Internet
contributes to this process inasmuch as dissident and other organizations in authoritarian
60
I Iauben and I Iauben.
61 For a weU-balanced description of this controversy see Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors
and Instruments, Issues and lmperatii<es (Washington: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1995);
and Paula R. Newberg and Thomas Carothers, "Aiding—and Defining—Democracy," World Policy Journal
(spring 1996): 97.
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regimes use it as a tool to communicate government abuses to the outside world. Policy
makers in states considering the application of pressure are better able to make informed
decisions when direct, on-the-scene evidence, such as these organizations provide, is made
available.
The significant impact that global NGOs can exert in promoting democracy
and the key role that the Internet plays in the effectiveness of these organizations already has
been established. States may choose to expand these efforts by encouraging and supporting
such NGOs. Through this support, the Internet, then, serves as an indirect policy-making tool
of states desiring to promote democracy abroad.
The Internet's role in enhancing these specific external facilitating factors is
limited to the extent that they are employed by states and/or NGOs; the Net's impact in this
respect is not an independent, self-propelling force as was evident in the analysis of the
Internet's relationship to domestic facilitating factors. The Internet is, however, at the
forefront of a larger more general self-propelled driving force that is facilitating
democratization through both domestic and external means. This force is globalization.
Globalization is an imprecise and often misused term that has come to mean
everything from Utopian dreams of peace through world government and the destruction of
cultural differences, to the relatively recent marked rise in international trade and the
multilateral agreements that have enabled that trend. The study of globalization consists of an
entire body of literature. This literature is generally distinct from democratization literature, yet
the two frequently overlap. This paper does not attempt to discuss globalization in detail but
instead briefly examines the general features of the trend including the role of the Internet and
implications for democratization, and future prospects for the expansion of globalization.
The explosion of international communication technologies and
improvements in the cost and speed of global transportation have brought the world closer
together. A global community is taking shape with many of the characteristics normally
associated with traditional communities: culture, norms and institutions. The Internet serves as
the primary medium through which this global community is forming. Wriston observes that:
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The convergence of computers and telecommunications has made us into a
global community, ready or not. tor thefirst time in history, rich andpoor, north and south,
east and west, city and countryside are linked in a global electronic network ofshared images
in real time. Ideas move across borders as if they did not exist. Indeed, time %ones are
becoming more important than borders?
2
Not surprisingly, this global community is adopting culture and norms
consistent with what has arguably become the world's most influential political and social force
of the last decade: democracy. Wriston continues:
A global village will haveghbal customs. Denyingpeople human rights or
democraticfreedoms no longer means denying them an abstraction they have never experienced,
but violating the established customs ofthe village. It hardly matters that only a minority of
the worlds people enjoy suchfreedoms or the prosperity thatgoes with them; these are now the
benchmarks. More and more people around the globe are demanding more say in their own
destiny. Oncepeople are convinced that this is possible, an enormous burden ofprooffalls on
those who would deny them.
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The result is an admittedly amorphous, yet surprisingly powerful and
independent force that applies internal and external pressure to regimes that fail to adopt its
central precepts. Wriston speaks of both the present and the future when he contends that
The ghbal conversation puts pressure on sovereign governments that over
time will influence politicalprocesses all over the world. The information revolution is thus
profoundly threatening to thepower structures ofthe world, and withgood reason.
4
The prospect this trend offers for the worldwide expansion of democracy is
obvious. The global culture views authoritarian regimes as undesirable relics of an age that has
long since passed. Expansion of this view globally may contribute to undermining the
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, while at the same time giving strength to the forces
propelling the advance of democracy.
Authoritarianism is said to offer the best available means to counter mis rising
tide of globalization. By simply employing existing structures of control and redoubling efforts
to close their society to outside influences, dictatorial regimes may believe that they can
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number of cases in Southeast Asia today, such a plan provides little prospect for success.
Authoritarians in today's world are faced with a fundamental dilemma: close their societies and
forego the possibility of economic expansion, modernization and growth, or welcome foreign
investment, economic liberalization and global communications, and face the challenges that
globalization presents. Increasingly authoritarian regimes are finding themselves forced to
pursue this latter path just to maintain, at least in the short run, whatever small degree of
legitimacy they command. This dilemma and its far-reaching effects are fully explored in the
context of the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia in the next two chapters.
Will this trend toward globalization go too far and negatively influence the
democracy that it aims to erect? This question forms the crux of the globalization debate.
Sclove, for instance, argues that the globalization the Internet brings will create a "cybernetic
Wal-Mart effect" where online commerce will rob local shops and professional service
providers of their business base, causing them to be overrun and acquired by large
corporations located across the globe, or if they resist, to ultimately fold. This effect, Sclove
contends:
. . . means increased Local dependence on distant corporations and on global
economicforces. . . neither of which can be influenced very much from the local level. That
means less local control over local circumstances, which fundamentally diminishes democracy
(that is, people's ability to influence basic circumstances oftheir lives).
6
Douglas Barnes and Anne Wells Branscomb each make separate cases for the
imminent arrival of a new and dangerous form of global extraterritoriality.67 Because global
networking clearly blurs the line imposed by national borders and makes it difficult to
determine in which states' jurisdiction cyber-events (such as commerce) actually occur, states,
according to this argument, will increasingly resort to international mechanisms and/or
unilateral action to retrieve and prosecute individuals from other countries that it perceives
have violated its (local) laws. Barnes concludes that, "As the net expands, it seems to increase
66 Sclove.
67 Douglas Barnes, "The ComingJurisdictional Swamp of Global Internetworking" [on-line] 16 Nov. 1994;
available http://www.eff.org/Net culture/Global village/anon )uns.arricle ; Internet; accessed 9 May 1997;
and Anne Wefls Branscomb, "Jurisdictional Quandaries for Global Networks," in GlobalNetworks: Computers and
International Communication, ed. Linda M. Harasim (Cambridge, MA The MIT Press, 1994).
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the opportunities for conflict faster than the opportunities for togetherness and world
understanding.
"68
On a grander scale, a number of authors have posited that the expansion of
global computer networking will make the nation-state, the basic unit of democratic
governance, an ineffective, if not endangered, phenomenon.69 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. argues
that:
The Computer Revolution offers wondrous new possibilities for creative
destruction. One goal of capitalist destruction is the nation-state, the traditional site of
democracy. . . The computer turns the untrammeled market into a globaljuggernaut crashing
acrossfrontiers, enfeebling nationalpower of taxation and regulation, undercutting national
management ofinterest rates and exchange rates, widening disparities of wealth both within
and between nations, dragging down labor standards, degrading the environment, denying
nations the shaping of their own economic destiny, accountable to no one, creating world
economy without a worldpolity. Cyberspace is beyond national control No authorities exist
toprovide international control Where is democracy now?
Each of these contentions, warning of the imminent disaster that globalization
offers, are one-sided analyses that fail to recognize that governments are active participants in
the Information Revolution as well as individuals, corporations and other non-state actors.
Each of these visions portends to foresee the final stages of the globalization transformation,
yet each fails to account for the solution to each of these problems that is already occurring
and is growing in strength as globalization advances. This solution is transgovemmentalism.
Recognizing the powerful role played by the Information Revolution, Anne-Mane Slaughter
explains that neither the unaccountable world government envisioned by liberal
internationalists, nor the anarchic chaos envisioned by modem medievalists (such as those
quoted above) will occur:
68 Dames.
69 Schlesinger, 2-12; and Mathews, 50-60.
70 Schlesinger, 8.
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The engine ofthis transformation [a shift awayfrom the state—up, down,
and sideways—to supra-state, sub-state, and, above all, nonstate actors] is the information
technology revolution, a radically expanded communications capacity that empowers
individuals and groups while diminishing traditional authority. The result is not world
government but global governance. Ifgovernment denotes the formal exercise ofpower by
established institutions, governance denotes cooperative problem-solving by a changing and
often uncertain cast. The result is a world order in which global governance networks link
Microsoft, the Roman Catholic Church, andAmnesty International to the European Union,
the United Nations, and Catalonia/ 1
Nation-states are not disintegrating under the heavy weight of globalization,
and no sign of" world government is visible on the horizon. What is clearly occurring is that a
form of "cooperative governance" or transgovemmentalism is emerging. Slaughter observes
that:
A new world order is emerging, with lessfanfare but more substance than
either the liberal internationalist or the new medievalist visions. The state is not disappearing,
it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts—courts,
regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their counterparts
abroad, creating a dense web ofrelations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order!
2
Transgovemmentalism maintains and strengthens the nation-state by
nationalizing regulations and agreements reached through functional networks of global actors.
These actors, working in concert and mutual interest with each other, produce "rules
concerning issues that each nation already regulates within its border: crime, securities fraud,
pollution, tax evasion."
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Each state then implements the agreed upon regulations by
codifying them into the states' body of national law. The result is a collection of regulatory
agreements that are self-enforcing. Common interests induce each state to comply, yet
compliance is only enforced at the national level. States maintain the sovereignty to enact their
own laws—as they see fit—while maintaining a common standard across all states.
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Globalization is increasingly resulting in instances of transgovemmental
activity across a broad spectrum of issues and institutions. Transgovemmentalism expands
and enhances globalization while at the same time strengthening the nation-state as the basic





unit of governmental organization. For established democracies this retains the sovereignty
upon which they are based while simultaneously overcoming the problems associated with the
open, borderless and often anarchic nature of global communications networks.
Transgovemmentalism holds great promise to contribute independently to
democratization efforts as well. Transgovernmental networks and agreements need not be
established solely between democratic governments. Slaughter proposes that
Transgovernmental ties can strengthen institutions in ways that help them
[regulatory agencies and judiciaries in nondemocratic states} resist political domination,
corruption, and incompetence and build democratic institutions in their countries, step by
step.... "Expanding transgovernmental outreach to include institutions from nondemocratic
states would help expand the circle ofdemocracies one institution at a time."
The "horrors" of globalization, then, may be a mere mirage. Globalization, as
a social and political force, is gaining increasing momentum as Internet and other international
communication mediums continue to expand. Far from producing either global anarchy or a
world government accountable to no one, the trend toward an emerging global culture may
very well strengthen the nation-state and facilitate further democratization.
2. Role of Internet in the Consolidation of Democracy
As a number of democratic reversals in the wake of both the first and second waves of
democratization have so graphically demonstrated, a transition to democracy is not an end
state in itself. For democracy to persist it must be consolidated so that the possibility of a
democratic reversal or stagnation becomes remote. Diamond observes that:
Consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly andprofoundly
legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral
and institutional changes that normalise democraticpolitics and narrow its uncertainty.
Two factors are key to democratic consolidation: political institutionalization and civil
society. Diamond argues that of these two factors, political institutionalization is "the single
most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy." Political
institutionalization means that key institutions must be strong, robust and able to implement
75 Ibid., 194.
76 Diamond, 'Toward Democratic Consolidation," 238.
77 Ibid., 238.
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policy, as opposed to weak and impotent institutions that have no power. Diamond argues,
that political institutionalization consists of:
(1) Strong, well-structured executives, buttressed by experts at least somewhat
insulatedfrom the day-to-daypressures ofpolitics. .
.
(2) Settled and aggressive (as opposed to volatile andfragmented) party systems—in
which one or two broadly based, centristparties consistently obtain electoral majorities or near
majorities. .
.
(3) Effective legislatures. . .composed of strong coherent parties with centrist
tendencies. .
(4) Autonomousprofessional and well-staffedjudicial systems/
11
The role of civil society in the consolidation process is much the same as in the
transition process, except that greater inclusion of a wide range of citizens and normalization
of democratic politics is required. Diamond argues that this normalization requires:
...the expansion ofcitizen access, development ofdemocratic citizenship and culture,
broadening of leadership recruitment and training and other functions that civil society
performs.
Each of these two factors may be strengthened by the availability of Internet access.
Globalization, a trend whose emergence and growth is due almost entirely to worldwide
Internet access, may improve and strengthen political institutions through
transgovemmentalism. Communicating and interacting with professional counterparts in
other countries, and with NGOs devoted to their particular field of interest, leaders as well as
lower level staff members of government institutions may be better able to learn and
implement institutional procedures that both fit their specific circumstances and have already
been tested and proven effective in other democracies. The Internet offers a wealth of
knowledge and experience to fledgling institutions that was previously unavailable, or at best
available only in the form of democracy assistance programs that were generally of short
duration with no long-term commitment.
As previously discussed, civil society is enhanced by Internet access as well. This is




Inclusion of greater numbers and a wider range of citizens into civil society are likely to be
achieved by Internet expansion. More so than other medium, the Internet democratizes
communication, taking control of mass communication away from the rich, the powerful and
the well connected and placing it in the hands of a much larger group of people, specifically
those with access to the Net. This is arguably the most important feature of the Information
Revolution. Shan Steele contends that:
The world that exists in the electrons of computerised communications, frequently
referred to as cyberspace, is unique in many ways. Because ofits ability to give voice to many
people communicating with many others, it has thepotentialfor being thefirst truly democratic
communications tool For unlike broadcast media, such as magazines and newspapers,
cyberspaceput the 'printing press' in the hands ofthe people.
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Critics contend, as already discussed, that the Internet offers no real democratization
of communication; the Internet, they argue, will simply further divide society between the
information "haves" and "have nots." Schlesinger states mat
The COMPUTERIZED world poses problems for democracy. Where the
Industrial Revolution created morejobs than it destroyed, the Computer Revolution threatens
to destroy morejobs than it creates, it also threatens to erect new and rigid class barriers,
especially between the well-educated and the ill-educated
Although initially appealing, this argument contains little depth. There is little doubt
that social stratification already exists along the lines that Schlesinger is suggesting. The
Internet, however, did not bring on these divisions; the barriers between well-educated and
lesser-educated individuals have existed for centuries. Across a wide range of societies, entry
into the "privileged" schools has often been based upon membership in aristocracy, family
wealth and influence, and any number of other insurmountable barriers. Knowledge has been
a commodity, carefully hoarded by privileged classes. The Internet, however, promises to
overcome many of the historic class barriers that persist even in today's most advanced
democratic societies. Offering access to all who desire it, can afford it, and who are willing to
search out knowledge, to find it, to learn it, and to make use of it, the Internet will equalize
more than it divides. Bauwens argues that:
80 Shari Steele, 'Taking a Byte Out of the First Amendment. How Free is Speech in Cyberspace?" Human Rights
[on-line] 23 (spring 1996); available http:/ /wwav.eff.org/ pub/(3ensorship/human nghts 96( '42' '.article ;
Internet, accessed 9 May 1997.
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The Internet is a great equalizer of knowledge, diffusing it throughout the social
body. It mil remove physical constraints on information processing activities, giving new
opportunities to Third World countries (the so-called derealization effect.).
1"
The argument that information-based class barriers will be erected fails to recognize
the dynamics of society and the Internet as well. That in less than five years worldwide
Internet access has grown from less than one million individuals to more than 50 million
today, and a projected 100 million by die year 2000 provides little support for Schlesinger's
contention. It is, in fact, quite reasonable to imagine that as the power brokers of centuries
ago, the monks and scribes of pre-enhghtenment times, were threatened by the arrival of the
printing press, today's elite are threatened by the democratizing potential of the Internet. As
previously noted, the comparison is so striking that there is reason to believe that the eventual
results will be similar. As the printing press continues to result in increasing levels of literacy
around the world, the Internet will achieve technological literacy but on an accelerated scale.
Bauwens argues that:
The Internet has a tremendous democraticpotential and mil undermine hierarchical
institutions on a grand scale. If the Western countries succeeded in the much more difficult
task of achieving mass literacy, we can seriously believe that we will achieve the task of
technological literacy. The only condition required ispolitical will.
A final objection to the Internet's impact upon democracy is frequently voiced.
Schlesinger argues that the instant interactivity offered by the Internet could result in an
undesirable form of "pure" or "full" democracy. "Pure" democracy is a form of government
where citizens "assemble and administer the government in person"84 as opposed to
representative democracy, where citizens express their will through elected representatives.
The "electronic town hall" envisioned by presidential candidate Ross Perot is an example of
the type of "pure" democracy brought on by the Internet that critics argue may destroy
Western style democracy. Notwithstanding the fact that this line of reasoning directly
contradicts the contention that that the Internet will create information "haves" and "have
nots", this argument merits some mention since it implies mat the Internet will go beyond





Labeling this new form of "pure" electronic democracy "teledemocracy" and
comparing and contrasting it with the traditional form of deliberative democracy, Scott
London concludes that the two models are simply expressions of two well-established schools
of democratic philosophy. Teledemocracy is more consistent with "rational choice" and "the
logic of collective action" theorists, while traditional deliberative democracy is more consistent
with the thoughts of "collective rationality" or "unitary democracy" theorists. 85 These closely
connected yet distinct schools of thought have framed a debate between democratic theorists
that has raged for centuries, resulting, for instance, in the inter-woven combination of bom
schools that exists in the United States today. The national level of government is better
characterized by the representative approach, while the local level leans more toward "pure"
democracy.
The Internet does not offer the potential to add anything new and dangerous to this
existing debate, other than to potentially tip the scale more in one direction than another.
Interestingly fears of "pure" democracy have been voiced over the decades at the introduction
ofmany technological and other advances. Television and public opinion polling, for instance,
were assailed as having the potential to destroy democracy in much that same manner that the
Internet is being accused of today, yet these fears have largely gone unrealized. Although
some have argued that these technologies have harmed American democracy, turning it into a
race for increasing levels of campaign contributions, the original fear and predictions of the
destruction of democracy have not materialized. Bauwens sums up the Internet's potential
well, arguing, "On the whole, we have to maintain that the democratic potential of the Internet
is far stronger than its undermining effect."86
More than simply enabling the spread of democracy, the Internet works to entrench
democracy into society. Through strengthening political institutions, expanding civil society,
and democratizing communication, the Internet facilitates the consolidation of democracy.
85 Scott London, "Teledemocracy vs. Deliberative Democracy: A Comparative Look at Two Models of Public
Talk," Journal oj Interpersonal Computing and Technology [on-line] 3 (Apr. 1995): 33-55; available
hrrp: / /www, west.net/ ~*insight/london /tele,htm ; Internet; accessed 12 July 1997.
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3. A Common Thread
When analyzing an issue as complex as democratization, it is fruitful to step back from
the fray of individual point and counter-point, put on a wide angle lens and take in the big
picture. Maybe a key principle has been missed, an idea or concept that, although not entirely
obvious, flows over the entire landscape of discussion. Indeed, in this case, this appears to
have occurred.
Shin contends that scholarly study of democratization has shifted in last two decades
from a search for "necessary and sufficient conditions" to a search for "facilitating factors" to
the democratization process. Democratization, it is argued, it too complex, too varied from
state to state for the existence of over-arching, general conclusions regarding its causes. A
close examination of the facilitating factors that have been advanced to explain the third wave,
however, proves differently. Each of the factors advanced contains a common element at one
level or another: the availability offree, open and democratic communication is the key to each ofthesefactors.
The world has witnessed the decline and fall of authoritarian rulers for centuries. Over
those centuries, more often than not, one authoritarian has simply been replaced by another.
Why then have the rules of the game suddenly changed? When dissatisfied with their current
ruler, what is now leading people to begin to adopt democratic principles as a defining form of
government, instead of simply following the orders of another dictator?
Each of the facilitating factors identified in the literature of the third wave points to a
central underlying theme. Rejection of centuries-long acceptance of authoritarian rule occurs
when people are exposed to the democratic alternative through free and open forms of global
communication.
As the next section will show, quantitative research indicates that increasing levels of
education and income are excellent predictors of the likelihood of increased democratization.
Shin's analysis of democratization literature presents a similar picture. Is education the key? It
is not easy to conceptualize how education by itself undermines the legitimacy of authoritarian
rule, and it is also difficult to believe that authoritarian rulers are allowing the "virtues of
democratic civilization" to be taught freely in the primary and secondary schools which they
control. On the contrary, it seems more likely that public education serves the state as an
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indoctrinating force, touting the benefits of strong government and glory of its wondrous
leaders.
When Shin speaks of the masses having been exposed to the "virtues of democratic
civilization, " and therefore having the "knowledge, skills, and spiritual incentives to pursue
democratic reforms," one must wonder where this exposure occurred. In the authoritarian
run schools? Tightly controlled local radio and television stations? Possibly the heavily
censored press? No, the answer here is quite clear. This exposure to the virtues of democratic
civilization comes as a result of access to free, open and global communication.
Perhaps, as suggested in the literature, rising income has caused people to embrace
democracy. This argument has a straightforward, logical appeal to it. Yet, as argued above,
increased purchasing power alone does not explain this social and political revolution; a new
house, better food, improved medical care and the like do not explain democratization. If
income is rising and standard of living is improving, why would people risk losing all of this
new gained wealth and comfort by rejecting their current form of government and demanding
democracy? Income has been a major factor, but only to the extent that it has exposed people
to the world around them. Access to global communications is what this new found wealth
has purchased and in the process has led to the massive social transformation that has
occurred.
What of the external pressure applied to authoritarian regimes? While much of the
pressure exerted by other countries consisted of direct diplomatic and economic actions, that
applied by global NGOs did not. Much of the pressure exerted on authoritarian regimes came
from global democracy and human rights organizations that operate almost exclusively in the
realm of global mass media. Increasingly, as has been noted, these organizations are
focusing—for very good reasons—on the Internet as a place to both collect and disseminate
information. The ability of these groups to apply successfully the pressure of global public
opinion, and to persuade policy-makers in the democratic world of the importance of applying
diplomatic and economic sanctions or incentives to authoritarian regimes is often directly
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related to the size, scope, and accessibility of a free and open source of global communication
within the state in question.
87
But what about "snowballing" or the democratic domino effect? "Snowballing" or
diffusion as referred to be Shin makes little sense by itself as a facilitating factor. Taken alone,
it is simply a correlational observation without a reasonable explanation of the mechanism
through which it operates. One must consider what mechanism might actually lead to such an
effect? Do the top leadership of the authoritarian regime observe democracies emerging
around them and realize that such change is desirable in their own country, and, therefore,
voluntarily abdicate power and initiate moves toward a transition themselves? Or, do strategic
elites in the business, academic, religious and political sector observe democracy on the rise
around them and, begin to believe that democracy could come about in their country as well?
Previous discussions of the importance of these strategic elites in the transition to democracy
would suggest the latter mechanism is much more likely than the former. Of course in the
controlled society in which they live, it is the existence of free, open and global communication
systems that educates these elites, informs them of changes in world around them, bolsters
their belief that democracy can succeed in their country, gives them the tools to start down the
long road of transition, and provides the forum in which they can organize and mobilize.
The common thread in each of these facilitating factors is the availability of free, open
and global communication systems. The Internet provides such a medium, on a scale that is
light years ahead of communication mediums that have preceded it, in quality, quantity, speed
and versatility. It is of no surprise and possibly little coincidence that the global explosion of
the third wave has occurred simultaneously with the global explosion of communication,
computer and networking technologies.
D. INTERNET AND DEMOCRACY - QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES
Researchers have attempted to quantify the relationship between the level of
democracy and a wide range of variables. Few statistically significant correlates have emerged
from this research. Level of education and income are generally agreed upon as the most
powerful correlates. One problem with this type of research is the lack of a universally agreed
87 Mathews, 54. Mathews argues that the recent rise in the power and influence and global NGOs is due in large
part to the availability of global networking technologies.
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upon set of indicators to measure democracy. As a concept democracy embodies a wide range
of ideas from self-determination to leadership accountability to civil liberties. In practice the
issue becomes even more clouded by the wide variety of forms that democracy may assume.
No universal formula exists to determine whether a country is democratic; the reality7 is that
democracy is a matter of degree, with some states exhibiting more and others less, indicating
that a simple "democratic or not" formula is neither possible nor desired.
This caveat aside, an annual worldwide survey of political and civil liberties conducted
by Freedom House has received widespread acceptance in the scholarly community' as a valid
indicator of the level of democracy in states around the world. Freedom in the World: The Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores states in two areas: political rights and civil
rights. Freedom House, established in 1914 by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, is a
widely quoted and highly respected nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to
promoting democracy around the world. The Survey provides two numeric scores (political
rights and civil rights) for each state and based upon those scores, designates each state as
"free," "partly free," or "not free." According the Freedom House,
The Survey attempts to judge all places by a single standard and to point out the
importance of democracy andjreedom. At a minimum, a democracy is apolitical system in
which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and
individuals who were not chosen by the government. Putting it broadly, freedom is the chance




Henry S. Rowen's analysis of the "Tide Underneath the Third Wave"' 1,9 exemplifies
recent attempts to identify and quantify statistical correlates with democracy using Freedom
House data. Rowen confirms prior studies, demonstrating that education (as measured m
years of schooling) and income (as measured in per capita GDP) are statistically significant
predictors of democracy. Table 2.1 summarizes these findings.90
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Education + Income .402
Note: All values significant at the 0.1% level.
Using multiple regression analysis with data from 1990, Rowen shows that the pattern
of variation between both income and education, and democracy is statistically significant
below the 0.1 percent level. This means that there is a greater than 99.9 percent certainty that
the observed pattern is not due to chance. The magnitude of this variation, expressed by the
coefficient of multiple determination (R2), indicates that roughly one-third of the observed data
supports the correlation between education, income and democracy, with education exhibiting
a greater degree of predictive power than income, and education and income combined having
greater predictive power than either variable alone.91
Rowen's analysis is indicative of the bulk of quantitative studies that have attempted to
identify predictors of democracy. Other variables have also been examined, including life
expectancy, infant mortality, population, geographic region, ethnicity, etc. Within the large
body of democratization literature, however, education and income have continued to surface
as the strongest predictors of democracy.
Given the significant level of attention that has been devoted to determining
statistically and quantifying predictors of democracy, it is surprising that a 1995 RAND
Corporation study, UniversalAccess to E-mail: Feasibility and Societal Implications, has gone virtually
unnoticed in democratization literature. Although this study is concerned primarily with the
societal impact of e-mail technologies within the United States, Chapter 6 of the study,
"International Implications for Global Democratization," is an independent statistical analysis
devoted exclusively to determining the impact of e-mail and computer networking
technologies upon the process of democratization. The implications of this research for the
91 Ibid., 318-319.
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study of democratization are vast and far-reaching; the level of internet connectivity within a
state is not only a strong, statistically significant predictor of democracy, but the data
conclusively shows that its predictive power is much greater than that of either income,
education or these two variables combined.
The RAND study is based upon the same general set of widely accepted assumptions
and methodology as the Rowen analysis. Freedom House data is used as a quantitative
measure of democracy, and multiple regression analysis is performed using a number of
variables. A new independent variable "interconnectivity" is introduced. Interconnectivity, a
term coined by Larry Landweber as a measure of the spread of global e-mail networks,
represents a measure of the number of network nodes per capita. This variable is drawn from
data compiled by the Matrix Information Directory Service, and includes the total number of
network nodes of the four major computer networks worldwide: Internet, BITNET, UUCP
and FidoNet.92
A visual representation of the RAND data set is staking. Before conducting any
statistical analysis, the strong relationship between interconnectivity and democracy is obvious.
Figure 2.1 is a representation of Freedom House democracy ratings plotted on a world
projection map.93 Darker shading indicates higher levels of democracy. Figure 2.2 is the same
projection map with interconnectivity scores for each country plotted. 4 Darker shading
•indicates higher levels of interconnectivity.
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Figure 2.1 World Democracy
The statistical analysis of this dataset is even more striking. Table 2.2 summarizes the
coefficient of determination for a number of variables as reported by RAND using single
regression. Most notable in this analysis is that interconnectivity displays the greatest degree of
correlation. It is a significantly better predictor of democracy than either years of schooling or
per capita GDP, approximately 1.2 times more powerful than education and greater than 1.6
times more powerful than income. Additionally, although these values are the result of
univariate regression and not multiple regression, the RAND dataset appears to confirm
Rowen's analysis. Coefficients for education and income in Table 2.2, although slightly higher,
closely approximate those reported by Rowen in Table 2.1.
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SOURCE: Matix Informafon and Directory Serxices, Inc.
Figure 2.2 World Connectivity
Referring to the univariate analysis in Table 2.2, RAND reports that:
A strong correlation between democracy and interconnectivity does, indeed,
exist. . . the correlation coefficientfor interconnectivity is not only large, it is substantially larger
than that ofany other traditionalpredictors ofdemocracy?*
Table 2.2








Note: Significance values not provided.
95 Ibid.
50
Multiple linear regression yields much of the same if not more conclusive results. Table 2.3
shows the results of 4 multiple linear regression models computed in the RAND study. 6
Since a single regression model can often result in spurious determinations, varying the model
provides a more representative picture of the results. Model I includes all six of the
prospective predictors analyzed in the RAND study, and clearly demonstrates mat connectivity
is a powerful predictor of democracy. The RAND report states of Model I that:
immediately apparent is that, again, interconnectivity emerges as the dominant
predictor. With greater than 99. 9 percent certainty, higher than thatjor any otherpredictor,
one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and
interconnectivity. Furthermore, the coefficient on interconnectivity is large. A single point
increase on the interconnectivity scale corresponds to an increase of 5 points in democracy
rating!
7
Model II narrows down the analysis, examining only 3 independent variables (income,
natural logarithm of population and interconnectivity). With three variables excluded
—
including the second most powerful variable, education—the adjusted coefficient of multiple
determination (R2) drops only slightly from Model I to Model II, indicating the relatively high
predictive power of interconnectivity. Further, although not indicated in Figure 2.3, the report
states that
Alternatively, when retaining those three variables [education, life expectancy and
literacyj and excluding interconnectivity, the goodness offit measure decreases by more than
twice as much. In other words, interconnectivity alone may be more importantforpredicting






Multiple Regression Models (RAND)
I II ] II IV
Dep. Vanable DEM* DEM* DEM* INT DEM* INT* GDP*
Ad). R2 0.583 0.536 0.583 0.832 0.472 0.833 0.597










Log(Population) -4.21 b -3.48b
4.21b
-4.09b
Education 4.81 b 4.61 b -288
Life Expectancy -0.076c -0.75c -0.1.29
Ethnicity 0.13 0.13 0.12
Literacy 0.034h 0.033b
Telephones 0.22» 0.19b
Note: Significance is indicated by notes: * Legend:
1 = Significance at
b = Significance at
c = Significance at
the 0.1 percent level
the 1 percent level
the 10 percent level
DEM = democracy vanable
INT = interconnectiv-ity variable
GDP = income vanable
The single vanable regression results, in conjunction with the Model I and II multiple
vanable regression findings establish a strong conelation between interconnectivity and
democracy. They do not, however, establish causation. Perhaps interconnectivity correlates
well with democracy because democratic societies demand greater access to new and improved
methods of communication. If this is the case then although connectivity correlates well with
democracy, it does not contribute to the emergence of democracy.
Model III addresses this issue of causation using a system of simultaneous equations
and two-stage least squares estimation. This model assumes that interconnectivity afreets
democracy and that democracy affects interconnectivity. Both interconnectivity and
democracy are examined as dependent vanables, comparing the relative significance and the
size of resulting coefficients between the two equations. Because both vanables (democracy
and interconnectivity) are independent variables in separate equations, at least one additional
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variable called an "instrumental variable" is needed for each equation. For the connectivity
calculation, literacy and telephone lines per capita are used as instrumental variables, and for
the democracy calculation, income, education, log of population, life expectancy and ethnicity
are used. Results of Model III are listed in Table 2.3. Interconnectivity remains a statistically
significant predictor of democracy with a coefficient that is even higher than produced by the
prior two regression models. The effect of democracy on interconnectivity, however, is not
statistically significant, indicating that the proposition that democracy causes interconnectivity
can be rejected.
Another possible explanation for the observed pattern of correlation between
interconnectivity and democracy is that a third variable is causing both. The logical candidate
would be income, since network connectivity is relatively expensive, especially in lesser
developed or developing countries where democratic transitions will likely occur. Model IV
tests this hypothesis much in the same manner as Model III, but using three simultaneous
equations instead of two. The results are consistent with the previous three models. RAND
states that
The 2SLS [two-stage least squares estimation] results... are consistent with all
those that preceded and do not support the hypothesis of economic development as the
confounding third variable. Strongly to the contrary, the regression coefficients for
interconnectivity on democracy and GDP are both substantial and statistically significant,
again above the 0. 1 percent level. Neither democracy nor GDP proves to influence
• • j 99
interconnectivity strongly.
Viewed as a whole, the RAND data establishes a convincing case that expansion of
interconnectivity—or the Internet—is a powerful tool for the expansion of democracy. The
study concludes that:
Despite inherent limitations of statistical analyses, every analytic perspective of this
study coherently and repeatedly emphasises interconnectivity is a powerful predictor of
democracy, more so than any ofdemocracy s traditional correlates.
'
From a policy perspective, if a central goal of United States national security policy is
to support the expansion of democracy abroad, then it is clear that "the United States should
support increased interconnectivity abroad, as this may aid the spread of democracy." 101
99 Ibid.
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In addition to the quantitative analyses presented above, the RAND study also
postulates mechanisms underlying the democratising effect of networking technologies:
The worldwide expansion of democracy may have less to do with how these
technologiesfawr domestic democratic processes than with how they spread democratic ideals
internationally. Information revolution technologies enable citizens ofprospective democracies
to learn more about how other societies operate. If they discover that others living elsewhere
live better thanks to democratic governance, they are likely to seek democratization. At the
same time, information revolution technologies empower citizens anywhere to broadcast charges
that their own governments have violated inalienable human rights. Thus, worldpressure can
be brought to bear against repressive regimes unable to hide their misdeeds as successfully as
before.
102
This argument closely parallels those theoretical arguments previously advanced
regarding the mechanisms with which the Internet promotes democracy. Along with the
quantitative data upon which this explanation is based, this argument encapsulates the
proposition that a common thread—the availability of bi-directional, free, and democratic





III. INTERNET AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Advancing theoretical arguments and statistical evidence that the Internet facilitates the
process of democratization provides a framework within which the Internet's democratizing
potential in specific states can be analyzed. Such a discussion does not, however, provide
conclusive evidence of what effects the Internet will have on the culture, politics and society
within a particular state. As with other technological innovations, the social and political effects
of the Internet vary from state to state and from region to region. While the "what may be
possible" discussion of the previous chapter is instructional, an in-depth analysis of how the
Internet is currently impacting upon the states of Southeast Asia is necessary in order to
properly assess its democratizing potential in the region.
The Internet is alive and well in many of the states of Southeast Asia, and is expanding
at a furious rate. If the general proposition, that the Internet facilitates democracy, is true then
the Internet-connected states of Southeast Asia will likely provide at least a few examples of
this process in action. This is the focus of this chapter and the next, testing the propositions
regarding the Internet's democratizing potential against the reality of the Internet experience in
Southeast Asia to date. The objective here is not to perform a rigorous hypothesis testing, but
instead to present empirical examples that clearly illustrate the causal logic, that throughout
much of Southeast Asia the Internet is increasing the likelihood of further democratization.
The thesis presented in this chapter—that the Internet is contributing to the
facilitation of democratization in Southeast Asia—rests on two important propositions:
(1) Several regimes in SoutheastAsia are,for whatever reasons, placing tremendous
emphasis on promoting continued economic growth and prosperity, and, in the process, are
finding that in today's information age, widespread access to the global Internet is nearly a
pre-requisite to continued high growth levels.
(2) The Internet, by its nature, does not permit partial absorption nor once it is
unleashed does it lend itself to authoritarian control; it is essentially a selfpropelled, take-it-
or-leave-it, all or nothing technology.
The dilemma created for autocrats by these two realities and the manner in which they choose
to respond encapsulates much of the Internet experience in Southeast Asia today.
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A. OVERVIEW
It is apparent from the graphical presentation in Figure 2.2 that the level of Internet
connectivity in Southeast Asia is low in comparison with much of the world. However, this
general observation oversimplifies the Southeast Asian Internet phenomenon. In Singapore,
for example, one in three households has a computer and 10 percent of those households
access the Internet, making it the most connected state in Asia. 103 Given Singapore's strong
commitment to building a National Information Infrastructure designed to link every home,
office and government ministry, it is likely that Singapore will become the most connected
country in the world within the next 5-10 years. 10 "' The level of connectivity in Malaysia, on the
other hand, is much lower. Yet the level of connectivity seriously understates the impact of
the Internet in Malaysia. A high rate of Internet expansion, coupled with powerful
institutional structures enabling its development have magnified the relative economic and
political impact of the Internet in Malaysia. 105
Other states verify Fig. 2.2's visual representation. Notwithstanding an extremely
limited number of officially sanctioned government, business and academic connections,
Burma has essentially excluded the Internet from its borders.106 Vietnam has permitted much
more Net access than Burma, but only within the context of tight government controls that
essentially exclude individuals, groups and institutions from gaining any meaningful access to
the Internet E-mail is the only widely available Internet service in Vietnam, and even that is
103 Gene Mesher, "The Internet in Asia," Internet World, [magazine on-line] 1 Dec. 1996, 56; available
http://www.internetwodd.com/1996/12/asia.hfml ; Internet; accessed 12 July 1997.
104 Edna Reid, "Strategic Utilization of Internet Singapore's IT200 and Library 2000 Plans" [on-line] (paper
delivered at the 62nd IFLA General Conference, 25-31 Aug. 1996); available http://www.nlc-
bnc.ca/ifla/I\7ifla62/62-reie.htm: Internet; accessed 12 July 1997.
105 Stephanie Langenfeld, "How Commerce Conquers Censorship in Southeast Asia," The Christian Science Monitor,
24 Mar. 1997; available from The Electronic Library [database on-line], http: / /www.ehbrary-.com; no file
identifier, Internet; accessed 9 May 1997; and "Malaysia's Information Ambitions: Virtually Fantastic," The
Economist, 1 Mar. 1997; available from The Electronic Library [database on-line], http: / /www.elibrary.com; no
file identifier, Internet, accessed 17 Oct. 1997.
106 Matthew McAllester, "Censorship on the 'Net Countnes Crack Down on Freedom of Cyber-Speech,"
Newsday, 3 Nov. 1996; available from The Electronic Library [database on-line], http://www.elibrary.com; no
file identifier, Internet, accessed 9 May 1997.
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subject to tight government restrictions. 107 Recent pronouncements indicate that the
government may be prepared to relax this policy and to invite greater Internet expansion, but
to date these promises have not yielded any meaningful results. 108
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia all exhibit structural enabling factors that
indicate a strong desire for greater network connectivity, but a lack of telecommunications
infrastructure, educated technicians and relatively lower levels of direct foreign investment in
high technology manufacturing industries have hampered Internet expansion in these
countries.
109
This is not to say that Internet is not expanding in these states, it is. The current
level of connectivity and relative rate of expansion, however, is much lower than that of
Singapore and Malaysia.
Based on these observations, a useful grouping can be made of the level of Internet
activity within the various states of Southeast Asia, in terms of relative level of connectivity,
rate of expansion of connectivity, and presence of political and economic enabling or
inhibiting factors. Table 3.1 presents such an arrangement. Category I consists of states that
exhibit a medium to high level of Internet connectivity with a high rate of expansion and
strong structural enabling factors. Category II states display a low to medium level of
connectivity, a medium rate of expansion and, as with category I, strong structural enabling
factors. Low or non-existent connectivity and strong structural inhibitors to Internet
expansion characterize states in category III.11
107 Martyn Williams, "Vietnam Regulations Part of Power Play for Internet," Newsbytes News Network, 10 June
1996; available from The Electronic Library [database on-line], http: / / www.elibrary.com: no file identifier;
Internet; accessed 9 May 1997.
108 Mesher, 56.
109 Ibid, 56.
110 Cambodia, Laos and Brunei—states normally grouped within geo-political designation "Southeast Asia"—are
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As the level and rate of expansion of Internet connectivity vanes from nearly the
highest level in the world (Singapore) to one of the lowest (Burma), the degree of democracy
across the Southeast Asian political spectrum varies greatly as well. As previously noted,
measuring democracy presents difficulties, requiring what is often considered a high degree of
subjectivity. In keeping with the bulk of the democratization literature, and in order to
maintain consistency with the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter II of this thesis,
Freedom House ratings for political rights and civil liberties are utilized as indicators of the
relative degree of democracy between states. Table 3.2 summarizes 1996-1997 Freedom
House data for the states of Southeast Asia under consideration. 111 Both the political rights
and civil liberties ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 indicating the greatest degree of
political rights and civil liberties, and 7 indicating the highest degree of repression ot these
factors.
Independent subjective analysis in the democratization literature of the degree of
democracy of the various regimes of Southeast Asia agrees in large part with the Freedom
House results. Muthiah Alagappa, senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu Hawaii,
for instance, presents a strikingly similar assessment of the degree of democracy of the states
of Southeast Asia. 112
Comparing the rough Internet connectivity groupings of Table 3.1 with the Freedom
House data of Table 3.2 produces a few obvious inferences. Most significantly, is that the
apparent causal relationship between Internet connectivity and democracy—if such a
111 Kaplan.
112 Muthiah Alagappa, "The Asian Spectrum," in The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy, 2d ed, ed. Larry Diamond and
Marc F. Plattner, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 342-349.
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Table 3.2
Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Southeast Asia
(Freedom House - 1996-1997)
Country Political Rights Civil Liberties Freedom Rating
Burma 7 7 Not Free
Indonesia 7 5 Not Free
Malaysia 4 5 Partly Free
Philippines 2 3 Free
Singapore 4 5 Partly Free
Thailand 3 3 Partly Free
Vietnam 7 7 Not Free
relationship exists—is not absolute. If the relationship were absolute, then one would expect
all states with strong political rights and civil liberties ratings to be categorized in Group I.
However, some states with relatively lower Freedom House ratings (indicating higher degrees
of political rights and civil liberties), such as Thailand and the Philippines, are categorized in
Group II, the median of the connectivity scale. This is consistent with the RAND quantitative
analysis. Only a portion (roughly one-half) of the RAND data is consistent with the
connectivity-democracy relationship.
Those countries ranked as most repressive by Freedom House, specifically Burma and
Vietnam, also represent the lowest levels of Internet connectivity and growth in region. Of
course this is simply an intuitive look at the data and in no way indicates statistical significance.
It is important to note as well that the two countries categorized in Group I as having the
highest degree of connectivity (Singapore and Malaysia) are nearly as close to Burma and
Vietnam in Freedom House rating as to Thailand and the Philippines. Additionally, Freedom
House ranks Indonesia as having the same level of political rights and only a slightly improved
degree of civil liberties than either Burma or Vietnam, yet Indonesia has significantly higher
connectivity than either of these states.
Freedom of the press is a specific civil liberty included within the Freedom House civil
liberties calculation for each country. Press freedom is a critical variable that warrants
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independent consideration when assessing the Internet's democratizing potential for three
reasons. First press freedom is a central defining characteristic of democracy. Dahl's
"procedural minimal" approach to defining democracy encompasses a number of political
rights and three key civil liberties: freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom
of association. 113 In the context of the Internet, freedom of expression and freedom of the
press are inseparably bound since the Net empowers individuals with the power of the press as
a form of self-expression. Secondly, as argued in Chapter II, the mechanisms with which the
Internet facilitates democratization rely primarily upon the Internet's empowerment of groups
and individuals with the power of the press and expression, and to a lesser degree in the Net's
ability to encourage new and different forms of association. Finally, as will become apparent
later in this thesis when discussing the specific political effects the Internet has had in Malaysia
and Indonesia, the primary impact of the net on these two autocratic regimes has been to bring
about a marked softening in the restrictions placed upon freedom of the press and freedom of
expression.
In a separate annual report on Press Freedom around the world, Freedom House
rates each state's level of press freedom through the assessment of four factors: laws and
regulations than influence media content, political pressures and controls on media content,
economic influences over media content, and repressive actions such as killing or jailing of
journalists, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, etc. Table 3.3 is the Freedom House 1997
Press Freedom data for the previously discussed countries of Southeast Asia. 11 ' The first three
measures span a one to fifteen scale with one representing the greatest degree of freedom and
fifteen the greatest degree of coercion and control. The last measure, repressive actions, spans
a similarly positioned scale of one to five. Not surprisingly die press freedom ratings in Table
3.3 closely parallel the individual civil liberties rating and overall freedom rating of each state
reported in Table 3.2.
B. ECONOMIC NECESSITIES
The data presented above for at least three of the countries of Southeast Asia, namely
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, and also possibly Vietnam (where public Internet access is
113 Schmitter and Karl, 49.
114 Leonard R. Sussman, ed., Press Freedom 1997: haw Epidemic [book on-line] (n. p.: Freedom House, 1997);
available htt|i://w\,vft-.r"reeclotnhouse.ory/Press/Press97/mdex.htinl : Internet, accessed 26 Oct. 1997.
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Table 3.3
Press Freedom in Southeast Asia
(Freedom House - 1997)
Country Laws Pressure Econ. Repression Total Rating
Burma Broadcast 15 15 15 4 99 Not Free
Print 15 15 15 5
Indonesia Broadcast 12 15 3 5 77 Not Free
Print 10 15 12 5
Malaysia Broadcast 10 14 5 1 61 Not Free
Print 10 13 7 1
Philippines Broadcast 5 8 8 2 46 Partially
Print 5 7 9 9 Free
Singapore Broadcast 13 8 7 66 Not Free
Print 13 10 15
Thailand Broadcast 7 7 2 34 Partially
Print 5 5 5 3 Free
Vietnam Broadcast 14 14 69 Not Free
Print 14 14 10 3
at least being contemplated) raises two important questions: (1) Given the open and anarchic
nature of the Internet, why would a dictator, whose rule is based upon predictability and
control, invite or even allow the Internet to enter his country? (2) If allowing Internet access
became a necessity, why would this same autocratic not severely restrict it to such an extent so
as to negate its politically destabili2ing effects? The latter of these two questions is addressed
in the following section; here the former is examined.
The authoritarian leaders of these countries see information-based high technology
investments as a key factor in building competitive, growth-driven economies. An advanced
telecommunications infrastructure, for instance, is now recognized throughout Southeast Asia
as an essential element in achieving economic competitiveness. 11 Information technology
115 Mark L. Clifford, "Asia's Furious Phone Derby," Business Week International, 17 Feb. 1997, available from The
Electronic library [database on-line], http: / Avww.elibrarv.com; no file identifier; Internet; accessed 17 Oct.
1997.
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projects of previously unheard of size and scope are quickly becoming commonplace within
these aspiring "dragon" economies. Mayalsia's new Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), for
example, is an information technology investment of unprecedented proportion, touting an
estimated pnce tag in excess of $40 billion for construction costs alone. 116 Singapore's
Sembawang Media is at the center of a major international consortium whose goal is to
establish an Asian Internet backbone. Singapore stands to become the Internet hub for all of
Southeast Asia. 11
'
The Internet of course is the driving force for the information revolution. For the
developing states of Southeast Asia, Internet investments produce a number of concurrent
results. First, in the short term, coupled with Southeast Asia's relatively cheap labor costs,
state-subsidized tax incentives, and potential future market, they provide serious enticement to
American, Japanese and European information technology manufacturers. In the
telecommunications market alone an estimated $18 billion flowed to Southeast Asia in 1996, a
number that is expected to top $30 billion by the year 2000. 118 Second, information
technology and the Internet in particular are seen by Southeast Asian economic planners as an
effective tool with which to "leapfrog" into the twenty-first century, bypassing several
generations of already obsolete technologies and skipping past "decades of painful
development" that the developed Western world was forced to endure. 119 Third, the Internet
promises to qualitatively improve the education level of the workforce, helping to bring about
the "knowledge worker" that the information technology sector so badly needs. 12'
Perceived economic necessity in order to ensure future long-term economic growth,
then, is the reason that the Internet and other information technologies are openly courted in
the autocratic states of Southeast Asia. Ramo argues that "Information, it turns out, is a far-
116
"Malaysia's Information Ambitions: Virtually Fantastic.
117 Mesher, 56.
118 Clifford.
119 Mesher, 56; and Ramo.
120 Ramo.
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better-financed candidate than its opponent. The real force behind info openness is not
political idealism by economic reality." 121
Of course the arrival of the Internet in Southeast Asia has not occurred without
problems for autocratic regimes. Increased connectivity has necessarily resulted in a
degradation of political control. Stephanie Langenfeld, junior fellow at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that:
New high-tech firms depend upon Jree plows of information for success in the
marketplace. As a result, corporations investing in Southeast Asia are insisting on the
establishment offreedom of expression, unintentionally taking on traditional roles offoreign-
policymakers—promoting both economic andpolitical liberalisation. 122
This is true because, as will be explored in depth later, the Internet is nearly
impossible to control, and any form of control that were to be effective would likely backfire
on the regime, negating many of the benefits that the Internet provides. Foreign investors and
firms fear that arbitrary controls on the Internet will eventual hamper information flows and
are therefore more reluctant to invest in countries where such controls are planned or
attempted. In Singapore, where strict controls are enforced over Internet content with regard
to pornography, religion, race and politics, officials have learned a hard lesson. Neighboring
Malaysia, with a less impressive infrastructure, has successfully courted a number of American
information technology giants (such as Microsoft and Sun) to locate their East Asian regional
headquarters in Malaysia instead of Singapore. The Malaysian MSC Bill of Guarantees, which
promises against any form of future Internet censorship was a key deciding factor. 123
Christopher Kedzie has coined this phenomenon the "Dictator's Dilemma," arguing
that "greater connectivity can come only at the expense of political control."
124
Presenting the




124 Christopher R Kedzie, "The Third Waves" [on-line] (paper presented at the Information, National Policies,
and International Infrastructure Conference, Harvard Law School, 28-30 Jan. 1996); available
http: / /ksgwww.hareard.edu/up/GIIconf/kedzie.htail; Internet, accessed 29 Oct. 1997. Kedzie authored
Chapter 6, "International Implications for Global Democratization," for the previously cited RAND report
(Anderson et al.) on universal access to e-mail.
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sought the economic benefits that information technologies offered but failed in his ability to
maintain political control over those technologies.
1
" Additionally, using the RAND dataset
and additional historical data from Freedom House, Kedzie performed a regression analysis of
the change in democracy from 1983 to 1993 versus the change in connectivity for that same
time period for all countries in the dataset His conclusion, with a confidence factor of greater
than 99.9 percent, is that "there is not a single case of even a moderate increase in the level of
interconnectivity that is not also accompanied by at least a moderate increase in the level of
democracy." 126
Ironically then, the authoritarian regime mat seeks to bolster its position by attempting
to harness the economic riches that information technologies offer may instead be sowing the
seeds of its own demise. In a more detailed examination of the impact of the Internet in
Malaysia and Indonesia in Chapter IV, it will become apparent that the Internet has already
resulted in some degree of loss of political control in both states.
C. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE INTERNET
If the leaders of a state desire to forego the economic advantages presented by the
Internet, they may choose to do so. A regime that foresees the dangers presented by the Net
can choose, as Burma and to a lesser extent Vietnam have chosen, to exclude the Internet
from its borders. Or an autocrat may choose to allow the Internet—and in fact even
encourage its spread within the country—while maintaining a tight level of control over the
content that it carries. Finally, a regime may allow unfettered Internet access, accepting minor
losses in political control, yet explicitly planning to withdraw full Internet access (through
either of the two mechanisms mentioned) if the regime's power becomes threatened in any
way. This is the conventional wisdom displayed by several of the autocratic regimes of
Southeast Asia.
Singapore, for example, has devised and implemented an elaborate system of
monitoring, control and censorship over Internet content. The Singapore Broadcasting




Guidelines," which prohibits the transmission or receipt of any material that is pornographic
or offensive, that does not respect racial and religious harmony, or that in any way jeopardises
or undermines public security and national defence. The following is a selected excerpt from
the SBA's "Internet Content Guidelines":
Thefollowing Internet contents should not be allowed:
4. Public Security and NationalDfence
a. Contents whichjeopardisepublic security or national defence.
b. Contents which undermine the public confidence in the administration of
justice.
c. Contents which present information or events in such a way that alarms or
misleads any or all ofthepublic.
d. Contents which tend to bring the Government into hatred or contempt, or
which excite disaffection again the Government.
V2/
Employing a sophisticated system of proxy servers and full-time censors, the SBA
effectively "blocks" access to undesirable Internet materials by Singaporeans. Peng Hwa Ang,
lecturer at the School of Communication Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, and Berlinda Nadarajan, member of the Policy and Survey Unit and the National
Computer Board, Singapore, write that government authorities justify Internet censorship
based on the belief that uninhibited reporting can lead to racial and ethnic violence. 128 Ang
and Nadarajan also mention five times within the space of a detailed seven page essay that
technologically based censorship, such as that being attempted by the SBA, is not feasible,
concluding that, "The Singapore government is well aware that it cannot do much to censure
the Internet."
129 And finally, in what appears to be support for Kedzie's "Dictator's Dilemma"
theory, Ang and Nadarajan state that:
127 Singapore Broadcasting Authority, SBA Safeguards Community Interest through Internet Regulation, [on-line] (press
releaase) 11 July 1996; available htrp://\\^vvv\erY.on>/---decl/in/gloh;i]/sg/regT.Jrittons.071196.release ; Internet;
accessed 9 May 1997.
128 peng Hwa Ang and Berlinda Nadarajan, "Censorship and the Internet A Singapore Perspective,"
Communications oj'theACM 39 (June 19%): 73.
12y Ibid., 78.
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Singapore's case is instructive in that it is trying to both control information and yet
reap the benefits of the information age. Current thinking suggests that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve both aims. Singapore is trying nonetheless.
m
Internet technology experts agree. Nicholas Negroponte, head of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Media Lab argues that, "The use of centralist means to censor the
Net is doomed to failure, unless you simply frighten people into silence." 131 Even that may
difficult to achieve given the proliferation of free cryptographic software and the emergence of
circumvention technologies such as International Discount Telecommunications' international
call back service that allows a user anywhere in the world to connect to the net using a private
international telephone line at cheap U.S. phone rates. 13 ' Frightening people into submission
appears to be working in states such as Burma and Vietnam that have never had a meaningful
level of computer network access. In the remainder of the states of Southeast Asia, however,
where the Internet has become relatively established, and where a number of users have
developed a degree of sophistication and savvy with regard to the technical limitations of
government monitoring and censorship techniques, it is conceivable that effectiveness of self-
censorship may soon dissipate. Signs of such a move are already surfacing in Indonesia and
Malaysia where an increasing number of individuals regularly read government banned
publications on the Internet
Finally, it is important to reiterate the key issue involved in authoritarian control of
.Internet access and content, it is unlikely if not impossible for a regime to reap the economic
benefits that information technologies such as the Internet present while simultaneously
attempting to centrally control them. Only Singapore has attempted such a policy. Indonesia
and Malaysia, regimes that Freedom House (Table 3.3) has identified as severely repressive in
terms of freedom of the press, have foregone any serious attempts to control or censor the
Internet
130 Ibid., 78.
131 Nicholas Negroponte, quoted in Simon Fluendy, "Pandora's Box: Asian Regimes Struggle to Keep a Lid on
the Net," Far Eastern Economic Review 159 (26 Sep. 1996): 71-72.
132 Richard Sagall, "Slipping Through the Net," Economist, 4 June 1994; available from The Electronic Library
[database on-line], http: / /wwTv.elibrary.com: no file identifier, Internet, accessed 9 May 1997.
66
D. EFFECTS ON "ASIAN CULTURE"
Perhaps the most contentious issue facing the Internet's arrival and spread through
Southeast Asia today is the perception by some that the Internet is a 1990s version of
American imperialism—cybercolonization if you will. Singapore's Information Minister warns
that, "the influx of objectionable materials via the new electronic media, if left unchecked, will
undermine our values and traditions." 133 United States attempts to promote democracy in
Southeast Asia are frequently greeted with same claim. Alagappa contends that in China,
Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Laos:
The same elites who support economic development reject democracy. In part their
rejection of the democratic ideal is a response to the perceived 'reactionary imperialism' ofthe
West. In part it is aimed atpreserving their own power. Yet it also stemsfrom a conviction
that liberal democracy is not well suited to Asian cultures and that it will hinder
modernisation.
u*
Western individualism is the real culprit according to Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and
Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia. 135 In the "Asian culture" they so admire, individuals
submit to the authority of family and state in what is perceived as a Confucian tradition, while
in the West individualism has run amok, resulting in decadence, disorder and decay.
Democratization theorists have addressed this proposition directly. Samuel P.
Huntington does not accept the argument that "Asian culture" rejects democracy but he does
point out that the Asian tradition may present a significant obstacle to further democratization
in Asia.
136
Francis Fukuyama, on the other hand, argues that such characterizations of Asian
culture are simply "self-serving distortions of Confucianism" designed for the sole purpose of
maintaining the status quo for existing autocrats.
137 Fukuyama contends that:
133 George Yeo, Singapore Information Minister, quoted in I Ienderson.
134 Alagappa, 343.
135 Schlesinger, 9.
136 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in The Gbbal Resurgence ofDemocracy, 2d ed., ed. Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3-25.
137 Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," in The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy, 2d ed., ed. Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19%), 325.
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There is no theoretical reason why Confucian social structures could not coexist
perfectly well with democratic political institutions, indeed, the case can be made that
democratic institutions would be considerably strengthened by them.
1ils
This argument is relevant to the question of the Internet's democratizing potential in
Southeast Asia only to the extent that "Asian culture" has the potential to preclude the
emergence of democracy no matter the facilitating factors that may be present. Such
conditions are extremely unlikely given the empirical evidence of democratization in recent
past. Fukuyama states that
OtherAsian societies, such as Taiwan and Korea hai>e been moving toward a very
recognisable form of Western democracy in the past decade without thereby losing their
Confucian character.
Xi9
This thesis does not that contend the further democratization is necessarily likely in
Southeast Asia, only that further expansion of the Internet in Southeast Asia will contribute to
the likelihood that more states will transition to democracy. The important point here is that
there is nothing peculiar about Asian societies or Confucianism that precludes a democratic
transition. Shin, in his review of the literature of the third wave, states that a number of
authors (Giuseppe Di Palma, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Terr)' Karl) and
"many other scholars generally agree that democracy can be crafted and promoted so as to
survive and grow even in a culturally and structurally unfavorable environment." 1 Strobe
Talbott summarizes this central lesson of the third wave when he argues mat:
This globe-spanning sequence of events—which has included the grassroots Chinese
democracy movement of 1989, the elections in the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia, and
the more recent voting that legitimised the Palestinian Authority in Ga%a and Jerico and
gave Taiwan its first freely chosen president—should have discredited the claim that
democracy is exclusively a Western idea. It should have laid to rest the contention that some
peoples and cultures are unsuited to democracy—that Asians are predisposed to live under
Confucian authoritarians, Latin Americans under caudillos or camandant'es, Africans under








Claims of Asian exceptionalism based on an amorphous conception of "Asian culture"
reflect more of an autocratic defense mechanism than a valid prediction of the likelihood of
future democratization in Southeast Asia. The existing reality that the Dictator's Dilemma
presents to many Southeast Asian rulers underscores this fact. These rulers have each made
conscious decisions to invite and often promote a strong Internet presence within their state.
The need for expanding wealth and income obviously outweighs the feared cultural and social
chaos that the Internet—the bastion of Western individualism—threatens to bring.
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IV. CASE STUDIES - MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA
Malaysia and Indonesia offer instructive insights into the democratizing power of the
Internet. These states were chosen for deeper analysis for two reasons. First, the availability
of existing data on and analysis of the Internet in the majority of countries in Southeast Asia is
sparse to non-existent. These two states, along with Singapore, provide the largest quantity of
available information.
Second, these states appear to offer the most conducive environments for testing the
Internet's impact on society and political economy. Referring back to the rough grouping of
states presented in Table 3.1, a study of Group III states (where the Internet is almost wholly
excluded) would prove futile since there is little or no Internet activity upon which to base an
examination. In Group II, Freedom House (Table 3.2) rates the Philippines as "Free" and
Thailand as "Partly Free," assigning relatively impressive political rights and civil liberties
ratings to each. Democratic improvements in these states—caused by the Internet or any
other phenomenon—may be more difficult to observe than in a state that is characteristically
undemocratic. Additional, it is likely that both Thailand and the Philippines are best described
as in the consolidation phase of the democratization process rather than the transitioning
• phase. This is important because, as Chapter II demonstrated, the expected effects of the
Internet upon democratic transition are much greater than those expected during
consolidation. Indonesia, the third state in Group II, however, provides fertile ground for
examining the role of the Internet in bringing about a possible democratic transition. Freedom
House rates Indonesia as "Not Free" with political rights and civil liberties ratings that are only
slightly better than those assigned to Burma and Vietnam, the most repressive regimes in
Southeast Asia.
Choosing between Malaysia and Singapore, die Group I states, was more difficult, and,
admittedly, more subjective. Both states are rated as "Partly Free" with identical scores for
political rights and civil liberties. The level of Internet connectivity in Singapore is clearly
greater than that of Malaysia, making it the seemingly obvious choice for study. Singapore's
massive program designed to regulate Internet content, however, has clouded the issue.
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Although there is a near universal consensus that such controls will be ineffective, so far the
Internet appears to have had little measurable effect on society, culture or politics in Singapore.
Some cracks are becoming visible 142
,
but none of significant merit to indicate that the Internet
is having any meaningful effect in altering Singapore's authoritarian status. Malaysia, then, was
chosen for analysis because of the profound impact that the Internet is having upon Malaysian
politics.
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia are not
intended as "representative" or "average" examples of the effects of the Internet in Southeast
Asia, but are more appropriately classified as "best case" examples of the causal relationship
that this thesis presents. These cases are not offered for purposes of hypothesis-testing but
instead are illustrative examples of the power of the Internet to bring about changes conducive
to democratization. Therefore, inferring that the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia have
widespread applicability for the rest of Southeast Asia (or elsewhere) is problematic. At best
these cases present a solid rejection of the null hypothesis, that the Internet plays no role in
facilitating democratic transition.
A. MALAYSIA
Malaysia, an ethnically diverse country of 20 million, has been ruled since 1981 by
Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, a Western-schooled physician. Mahathir's policies
have aimed at achieving two primary goals: gaining economic and social equality for the ethnic
Malay population (who constitute a slim majority) while ending racial hatred and violence, and
maintaining high levels of economic growth. By nearly all measures Mahathir has succeeded at
achieving these goals. To date, his affirmative action program has resulted in an improved
distribution of wealth without inciting any significant level of racial violence. 143 Economically,
142 As previously mentioned, Malaysia's ability to attract high tech US business away from Singapore may be a
reflection of Singapore's decision to limit Internet access. This could possibly be the cause of Singapore's
recent decision in October 1997 to downplay the extent of its Internet censorship regulations. In a press release
issued by the Singapore Broadcasting Authority on 22 October 1997 (SBA, "SBA Revises Internet Guidelines
for Clarity and Simplicity," [on-line] (press release) 22 Oct. 1997; available
http: / Arww. sba.gov.sg/newsrcl.hnn#p26 : Internet; accessed 2 Nov. 1997.), the SBA stresses the guidelines are
intended for regulating pornography and incitement of racial and religious violence only. No mention is made
of the political limitations imposed by the original guidelines The regulatory effects of these new guidelines are,
as of yet, unclear.
143 Anthony Spaeth, "Bound for Glory: He's Obsessed with Control and Quick to Bash the West, but Mahathir
Mohammad Has Left His Mark on Malaysia," Time International, 9 Dec. 1996; available from The Electronic
Library [database on-line], http://www.elibrarv.com; no file identifier; Internet, accessed 17 Oct. 1997.
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Mahathir's success is almost unmatched. With nearly zero percent unemployment and eight
years of continuous 8 percent economic growth, Malaysia's economy has grown faster than
any country except China.
With half of the population now living in cities and a per capita income of $3,900 per
year (double the level of six years ago), Malaysia is no longer a country of peasant farmers.145
Manufactured goods, most prominently semiconductors, microchips, and advanced
electronics, account for 80 percent of Malaysia's exports. 146 Donald Snodgrass, an economist
at Harvard, says that Malaysia is one of the only ethnically diverse states that has been able
make the transition from a manufacturing economy to a high tech economy while maintaining
a respectable degree of economic equity for a diverse spectrum of the population.147
Mahathir's success, however, has not come without a price. Many of his grand
development projects have benefited political cronies and several, such as his attempt to build
an indigenous steel industry, have ended in total failure. 148 Perhaps more important, however,
Mahathir has ruled Malaysia harshly, squashing nearly all vestiges of political dissent, opposing
nearly every move toward any form of democratic government, and severely limiting political
rights and civil liberties. Anthony Spaeth reports that:
To consolidate power in the mid-1980s, Mahathir showed a vast disdainfor such
notions asfreedom ofspeech andjudicial review of executive actions. In 1988, he ended the
independence ofthe country's British-stylejudiciary by deftly amending the constitution!
49
Malaysian officials deal harshly with any public questioning or criticism of government
policy or leadership. The Official Secrets Act requires a mandatory jail term for possession of
classified material, a term that has come to mean nearly any government document. Laws
regulate speech not only in public but in parliament as well. Specifically, the government




147 Donald Snodgrass, quoted in Ibid.
148 Ibid. For example, Perwaja Steel recently filed for bankruptcy, after losses of $2.75 billion.
14y Ibid.
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Malays. The government monitors and censors the press as well. 150 Previously presented data
from Freedom House (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) affirm the characterization of Mahathir's regime as
repressive, with little concern for political rights or civil liberties.
1. The Internet Arrives in Malaysia
On a scale probably only possible under the firm guiding hand of a man with the
power, determination and ambition of Mahathir, the Internet is arriving in Malaysia. Mahathir
has undertaken what can only be considered the largest, most expensive high technology
infrastructure project in history. The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) is a 9-by-30 mile zone
running south from Kuala Lumpur. This project, occupying 750 square kilometers (an area
larger than Singapore) and costing an estimated $40 billion, includes the biggest airport in Asia,
a new national capital city, an "intelligent" city called Cyberjaya, two "telesuburbs," both a
technology park and an "intellectual-property park," and a new multimedia university. 151 In
addition, Telkom Malaysia is constructing a $2 billion fibre-optic telecommunications
backbone for the MSC. 152
The MSC project is designed to provide a perfect environment for the creation,
distribution and employment of multimedia products and services. Mahathir has made the
project his top priority, stating the MSC provides an opportunity to capitalize upon the
knowledge, resources and wealth of the developed world. 1 The project provides incentives
for direct foreign investment by United States, Japanese and European high technology firms,
special exemptions authorizing unlimited employment of foreign "knowledge workers" and a
ten-year exemption from any tax of profits earned within the corridor. 1 4
Two final features of the MSC project are worthy of mention. The project calls for the
wiring of all regions, local governments, and schools throughout Malaysia to the global
Internet.
155
This provision is consistent with Mahathir's poor track record of attempting to
150 Langenfeld.
151




"Malaysia's Information Ambitions: Virtually Fantastic."
155 Langenfeld.
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share equitably at least a portion of the wealth generated by national economic projects with a
broad spectrum of Malaysian society. Finally, of primary concern to the analysis of social and
political change that the MSC may bring to Malaysia, the project includes a "MSC Bill of
Guarantees" that promises prospective investors that the Internet will not be censored (at least
within the MSC.) 156 Discussing the MSC project, Langenfeld reports that:
The crux of the package, however, is an offer Malaysia can make above
and beyond its regional competitors: the commitment against censorship ofthe Internet under
theMSC Bill ofGuarantees. In response, a number ofcompanies have made Malaysia their
HastAsian regional headquarters. 1
As previously discussed, a few key corporations, such as Microsoft and Sun, have
already made the important decision to base their Southeast Asian headquarters in Malaysia
instead of Singapore.
2. Internet Effects Upon Malaysia's Autocracy
Nonetheless, there are indications that the Dictator's Dilemma persists in Malaysia,
and that Mahathir has liberalized his repressive policies regarding freedom of expression and
the press, at least with regard to the Internet, only for the purpose of attracting foreign
technology investment dollars. Langenfeld argues that:
As Prime Minister Mahathir himself has expressed, the information
technology revolution is irreversible. In order to attract investors, the Malaysian government
wasforced toface its history ofstrict control ofpublic speech.
nH
Dr. Tengku Mohd Azzman Shariffadeen, director general of the Malaysian Institute of
Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS), adamantiy asserts official policy regarding the Internet in
stating that Malaysia is "at the moment quite fixed on die idea that there should be no
censorship."
159
Shariffadeen goes on to state that the reason for this policy is that "the Internet




159 Tengku Mohd Azzman Shariffadeen, quoted in May Jurilla, "No Censorship on the Internet, Says Malaysian
Government," Newsbytes News Network, 28 Mar. 1996; available from The Electronic Library [database on-line],
http: / /www.elibrarv.com; no file identifier, Internet; accessed 9 May 1997.
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country like Malaysia, we would like people to participate in governance—the transparency of
government. And of course, the private sector as well can be facilitated by the Internet." 16"
Such grand statements aside, the best evidence of the potential democratising power of
the Internet in Malaysia can be found on the Internet itself. Joseph Edwin, Hubert Humphrey
fellow at the University of Maryland, argues that the arrival of the unregulated Internet has
enabled "computer literate Malaysians to speak their minds without fear of retribution, albeit
anonymously through fake addresses that make it impossible to track down the original
author."
161
Self-censorship is not necessary on the Internet as the technology allows
anonymity.
Opposition political parties have seized the occasion as well. Edwin reports that, "A
month ago, the Opposition Democratic Action Part)' discreetly set up its home page on the
World Wide Web, with unedited party views." 1 Edwin provides further examples as well,
including the Opposition PanMalaysian Islamic Part)7
,
a political party that currently posts its
unauthorized part)7 publication Harakah on the net. Summarizing these recent moves in
Malaysian cyberspace, and observing that "the growing middle class in Malaysia will
increasingly desire an open forum to air its views and opinions," Edwin concludes that:
While critics argue that in Malaysia the Internet is still in its infancy and
only accessible to afew (about one in every 1,000 Malaysians), its long-term effects on the
democratization ofinformation appearpromising.
'
Langenfeld shares this view, contending that the investments of Western-based
multinational corporations have had the indirect effect of significantly improving civil liberties.
She suggests that as the countryside becomes wired:
160 Ibid.
161 Joseph Edwin, "Malaysia Moves Toward Less Censorship," USA Today, 3 May 1996; available from The





Malaysia's citizens will have access to completely uncensored newsfor the
first time in 30years, and multinational corporations will have incidentally won more for
human rights than many nations have achieved through diplomatic means. . . The Malaysian
case should serve as a model ofhowprivate corporations can influence democratization efforts.
164
The Internet's impact in Malaysia then has been varied. First, as predicted by Kedzie,
Malaysia has submitted to the dictator's dilemma: massively increasing Internet connectivity to
attract foreign high technology investment, necessarily reduces political control of information.
Second, individuals, groups and political parties have discovered that the Internet provides a
place to organize, to exchange information and debate substantive issues that are not yet
permitted in society at large. Finally, multinational corporations are finding that respect for
civil liberties in the states where they base foreign operations is increasingly becoming desirable
for creating and competing in the information age. Multinational investment patterns are
gravitating toward those states than understand this reality. Malaysia is a case in point.
B. INDONESIA
The Internet experience in Indonesia has been markedly different than in Malaysia.
This is understandable given the vast differences between the two countries. The fourth
largest country in the world, Indonesia's population tops 200 million. 165 Spread geographically
over thousands of miles, the islands of Indonesia represent a tremendous degree of cultural
and linguistic diversity. Roughly 90 percent of the population is Muslim, giving Indonesia the
largest community of Muslims in the world. 166 This fact by itself, however, is misleading, since
a tiny minority of ethnic Chinese wields much of the economic and political power within the
country.
President Suharto, sometimes referred to as Bapak Pembangunan or Father of
Development, has ruled Indonesia for over 30 years. A military officer by profession, Suharto
has stifled nearly all of his opposition, eliminating dissent with brutal force. Political rights,
civil liberties, and democratic institutions are essentially non-existent under the Suharto
regime. 167 At the same time he has succeeded to a large degree in advancing Indonesia
164 Langenfeld.
165
J. Stapleton Roy, "Letter from Jakarta," SAIS Review (summer/fan 1997): 77.
166 Adam Schwarz, "Indonesia After Suharto," Foreign Affairs 16 (July/Aug. 1997): 129-130.
167 Ibid., 120.
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economically. Growth rates under Suharto have averaged 6 to 7 percent annually, and billions
of dollars of foreign investment have poured into Indonesia. 168 At current rate of expansion,
the Indonesian economy may well become the world's sixth largest by the year 2010.16 '
Much of Indonesia's recent economic success has been due a huge expansion in
export-led manufacturing in a number of product areas including shoes, electrical appliances
and consumer electronics. 1 ° Indonesia's reliance upon oil for export income has dropped
from more than 75 percent in the late 1970s to almost 20 percent today. Manufactured goods
and the export of agricultural products have both contributed to reducing Indonesia's
dangerous dependence upon oil exports. 171 Unlike the vast majority of his OPEC
counterparts, then, Suharto has succeeded in creating a future for Indonesia beyond the
volatile and necessarily limited oil business.
Significant gains have been made in per capita income, but not to the extent
experienced in Malaysia. Per capita income has risen from $90 in 1968 to $1,000 in 1996. 17 '
The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta estimates that about 14-18 million (or 8 percent) of the
population now belong to Indonesia's quickly expanding middle class (defined as households
with annual incomes in excess of $5,000.)
173
1. Internet Arrives in Indonesia
Information and telecommunication technologies have not played a major role in
Indonesia's economic success, but their importance is increasing. Much of Indonesia's gains in
the field of high technology has been due to the forceful leadership of B. J. Habibie, the
influential Minister for Research and Technology (since 1978), and a man who is said to have
been a personal friend of Suharto for over twenty years.174 Habibie has carefully nurtured an
168 Jeffrey E. Garten, 'Troubles Ahead ui Emerging Markets," Harvard Business Reiiev (May/June 1997): 40.
169 Schwarz, 119.
170 James Clad, "The End of Indonesia's New Order," The WilsonQuarterly, Sep. 1996; available from The
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(spring 1997): 71-72.
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entire generation of locally and foreign schooled technologists who share his vision of a
national information infrastructure playing a critical role in the future of Indonesia. Habibie's
goal has been to acquire the technologies necessary to allow Indonesia to "leapfrog" several
generations into position as a leader in the field of high technology. Expansion of the
Internet has been a critical feature of this plan. 175
Indonesia's metropolises greeted the arrival of commercially available Internet services
in late 1995 and throughout 1996 with a high level of carefully engineered, government
promoted hype touting the benefits of the Net for business. The Internet was advertised as
offering everything from on-line employment services to information about the latest
Indonesian rock music. The Internet gaining a level of public attention and political clout far
in excess of the that which might be reasonable to assume given its small number of
connections (about 0.1 percent of the population) through substantial press coverage. 176
In December 1995, five Internet service provider's (ISPs) were servicing an estimated
15,000 users in Indonesia. By the end of 1996 that number had grown to 15 operating ISPs
supplying Internet service to 40,000 users. These numbers likely understate the actual number
of users since account and password sharing is common. 1 Originally started by young,
relatively independent, Habibie-educated technologists, many of these ISPs have been acquired
by conglomerates politically connected to Suharto, his cronies or the military.
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Personal gain
for the ruling elite now provides a strong motivation to further expand Internet services above
and beyond the advantages such expansion provides in attracting foreign investment capital.
Indonesia has contributed what can only be considered its own unique version of
Internet service to the global push for Internet expansion. In addition to standard home or
work based dialup Internet service that is common throughout the world, primarily
commercial but also government-operated Internet warungs—or kiosks—are emerging in
increasing numbers in the major cities and university areas of Indonesia. These warungs are






the hour to their clientele and that have become quite popular among the young (20-30 year
old) professional generation and their up-and-coming university counterparts that comprise
the large majority of Internet users in Indonesia. Many warungs offer inexpensive service
(costing roughly twice the amount of local telephone calls), making the Internet accessible to
large spectrum of the population.179
Accurate statistics on who is using the Net in Indonesia are non-existant. Commonly
used unsourced figures, however, indicate 42.8 percent access from commercial providers, 5.8
percent from research institutes, 29.5 percent from universities, 20.9 percent from government
sources and 1 percent from non-govemmental organizations.180 The average user in Indonesia
closely mirrors that of the United States and Europe: 25-40 year's old, 70-80 percent male,
single or married without children, well educated, in the middle to upper income groups. One
significant difference between Indonesian Internet users and their counterparts in the
developed world is that a shortage of workplace computers results in more than 50 percent of
Indonesian users accessing the Net from home compared with roughly 30 percent m the
United States and Europe. 181
Perhaps the most critical difference between Indonesian Internet surfers and those in
the developed world, however, is the type of information they obtain from the Net. Warung
operators report that users are somewhat interested tn cyber pornography, a huge Internet
attraction in the West, but unlike the West, Indonesian Internet users are at least as interested
in political information found on the Internet, especially that which is unavailable (or perceived
to be unreliable) in traditional media. 182 Apakabar, an alternative, e-mail based source of
political information and news published privately by John MacDougall in the United States,
has gained legendary status as a vehicle of free expression of ideas within Indonesia. ' Hill
and Sen state that
179 Ibid, 68-70.
180 Ibid., 74. Hill and Sen quote these "unsourced" figures as widely accepted, noting that in their extensive





Apakabar has grown into one of the most significant sources of information for
contemporary scholarship on Indonesia and is regarded by many activists in the NGO
community as a valuable means of disseminating their materials and crucial source of
uncensored domestic and international news.
'X4
Apakabar is frequently what is meant in Indonesia when the term "Internet" is used
and interestingly the term "apakabar" is loosely translated as "what is news?" Ensuring
anonymity of contributors, apakabar reports uncensored news within Indonesia within hours
of its occurrence. For many dissident and opposition groups, apakabar \$> the lifeblood of their
information retrieval and dissemination capabilities. The relative importance of apakabar, as
well as the ability of the Internet to self-repair, was graphically displayed when the list shut
down operations for a few weeks in the fall of 1996 due to financial difficulties. Other lists
(albeit smaller) emerged to fill the void immediately.185
Other political information abounds on the Indonesian cyber landscape. Tempo
Interaktif and Suara Independen, two dissident publications affiliated with the Alliance for
Independent Journalists and banned in the print world, appear unobstructed on the Internet. 186
Additionally, banned organizations such as the People's Democratic Party (PRE)),187 or
voiceless organizations such as the Surabaya Christian Communication Forum (FKKS) have
found safe havens for operation on the Internet. 188 Jim Della-Giacoma reports that:
Increasing availability to the Internet in Indonesia is opening a new, uncensored
avenuefor theflow of information between activists, politicians, political prisoners, students,
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2. Internet Effects on Autocracy
The Internet's direct effects upon Suharto's autocracy are quite clear; the indirect
effects and causes of the Internet's arrival in Indonesia, however, are subtle and more difficult
to observe. First, it is obvious that the regime not only allowed the spread of the Net through
the licensing of ISPs, but that it invited the Internet's expansion as a means to facilitate high
tech related economic growth. Second it is clear that the regime has found itself unable—or
possibly unwilling—to control the Internet to the extent that it controls traditional media.
Finally, signs are surfacing that the Suharto government has underestimated the powerful
effect that the Internet would have in highlighting dissent within Indonesia, and now finds
itselfbom involved in an internal power struggle over how to best deal with the problem, and
at the same time slowly realizing that the forces that have been unleashed may be extremely
difficult if not possible to stop.
The foregoing examples illustrate well that the Internet offers a new medium for the
expression of opposition opinions and dissent. Strict government censorship in traditional
media has been wholly abandoned on the Internet. Hill and Sen conclude that:
The speed ofexpansion of the Indonesian sections of the information superhighway,
the amount of disorder ofits traffic, seems to make policing it almost impossible. Seen thus,
the Internet apparently breeches the censorship and restrictions offreedom of expression
imposed by the New Ordergovernment.
'
Hill and Sen go on to suggest that the regime may view the Internet as unimportant,
therefore explaining the current hands-off approach.
191
Another reason may be, as Hill and
Sen clearly demonstrate elsewhere, that a serious rift is developing internal to the regime
between the Department of Tourism, Post and Telecommunication (Deparpostel), a strong
supporter of Internet expansion for economic reasons, and the Ministry of Information along
with the military and internal secunty forces, a block that sees the potential clangers that the
Internet poses to the carefully ordered and contained society in which they operate. " In any
case, the forces supporting the economic benefits of unfettered Internet access have thus far




been very successful in maintaining the Internet free of government attempts to control,
restrict or limit it.
Whatever the reasons for the current hands-off approach, even government authorities
recognize that controlling the Net now would be virtually impossible short of shutting down
the entire international phone system. 193 Kedzie's Dictator's Dilemma, then, is at work in
Indonesia as well. Unlike Malaysia, however, the Suharto regime appears to have failed to
predict the political liberalization that would necessarily occur with increased Internet access.
The reasons for this failure are not clear.
3. Civil Society
It is worth noting that the evidence of the Internet's impact in Indonesia goes beyond
simply subverting the regime's strong policies on censorship. The Internet is contributing to
the rise and strengthening of civil society in Indonesia as well. The previously mentioned
Internet warung phenomenon is an obvious example. The Internet's presence has resulted in
the creation ofnew public spaces that are being utilized for deliberative discourse of issues that
are taboo or not well represented in other forums. Empowerment of groups like the FKKS
and the creation of linkages to the larger outside world is a primary example of the expanding
"circle of influence" discussed in Chapter II between global NGOs and local groups.194
Finally, the potential exists for the Internet to assist in empowering Indonesia's rising
middle class into political action. Hill and Sen conclude that:
7/ [the Internet] is, in 1990s Indonesia, a tool—and a toy—
-for the mostly male
middle-class professionals. Almost every recent book on Indonesian politics refers to this
professional middle class spawned by the New Order, but calling for change—for
transparency, rule oflaw, and ultimately political democracy. In their hands, thefree peech
of the Internet may become a political tool to achieve some of the political liberalisation to
which they aspire.
19>
193 This view is voiced by Dewabrata, Information Director General for Radio, Television and Film in Yuli
Ismartono, "Indonesia-Media: Banned Publications Make a Comeback on Internet," Inter Press Service English
News Wire, 19 Mar. 1996; available from The Electronic library [database on-line], http: //www.elibrary.com; no
file ldenttSer, Internet, accessed 9 May 1997.
19< Hill and Sen, 87.
195 Ibid., 88-89.
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Of course the Internet may act as a container for middle class dissent, preventing it
from harming the regime. Hill and Sen further conclude that "political agency" or the will of
the middle class and others to seek political change is more important to the future potential of
such changes than technology itself. 196 Schwarz argues that at the present time the Indonesian
middle class, although disgusted with the corruption so evident in Suharto's regime, has little
propensity for confronting the regime as their commitment to political change is weak. 197 If
such a push for political action does occur, however, then the Internet may provide an
invaluable tool to those seeking to organize for change—as it is being used by dissidents and
opposition groups today.
4. Implications for Democratization
Hill and Sen conclude that link between freedom of speech on the Net and democracy
in Parliament or on the streets is tenuous. 198 Viewing the Internet in a vacuum, simply as a
force unto itself, one cannot reach any other conclusion. Viewed in the context of the lessons
of the third wave, however, and the common thread which underlies much of the research
into the facilitating factors for transitions to democracy, a different perspective emerges. The
likelihood that individuals will take the necessary actions to bring about democratic change is
depedent upon a wide variety of factors, any number of which may or may not be present for
the transition of a particular state. What the evidence has demonstrated is that the
communication possibilities of the Internet, through a variety of mechanisms, is one such
factor, and quite probably a strong one. In the case of Indonesia, clear indicators that the
mechanisms that tie the Internet to the facilitation of democratization are present in
Indonesia's current Internet experience. Nothing guarantees that democracy will ever come to
Indonesia, nor is there any particularly convincing evidence that democratization is likely to
occur in the near feature. The contention made m this thesis is that whatever the probability
196 Ibid., 89.
197 Schwarz, 133.
198 Hill and Sen, 84.
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that Indonesia will undergo a democratic transition in the near future, the presence and





Predictions of future events are necessarily rooted in assumptions. One can always
assume that current trends will continue, since a prediction of this sort is relatively easy to
make. But such an analysis is shallow since it fails to recognize the fact that radical,
unpredictable change does occur on a frequent basis. The arrival of the Information Age itself
is a prime example of this phenomenon. Few people, if any, in the late 1950s, 1960s or
possibly even the 1970s were willing or able to predict the incredible changes that the
Information Age has brought. For this reason, any predictions of future events are biased by
the assumptions under which they are made.
Rather than making predictions, then, it may be more useful to concentrate on
assumptions that appear most promising. With this thought in mind I offer the following two
insights that into the future of the Internet in Southeast Asia
1. Continued Internet Expansion
The driving forces that are compelling states to expand access to the global digital
infrastructure (the Internet) show no signs of diminishing. States have every incentive to seek
increasing levels of economic success for security and to improve the lives of their citizens.
The Internet offers quick access to the knowledge base that has driven the developed world to
high (and so far sustainable) standards of living. The Internet offers less developed countries
the opportunity to quickly "catch-up" with the developing nations. It is in the economic
interest of a number of firms in the developing states to continue to export the Internet to
other states as well. Having based large portions of their economies on information
production, provision and manipulation, information technologies are quickly becoming the




The Internet is living in a state of near absolute anarchy. This cannot persist long,
primarily because as trade and commerce expands on the Net, economic concerns will begin
to demand more order and more certainty in the infosphere. Exactly what forms this new
"orderliness" will take is certainly up to considerable question. A careful balance must be
maintained to ensure that sufficient independent autonomy exists on the Net to conduct the
business of information exchange, while ensuring that sufficient controls exist to lend a level
of predictability to business transactions that occur. The only foreseeable method to achieve
such a balance—on today's horizon at least—is the promise offered by globalization.
Transgovemmental networks of information systems, governmental (judicial, executive and
legislative) and business experts, as argued by Slaughter, provide the best hope for achieving
such a balance. Change in the current (un)structure of the Internet will be necessary for the
Information revolution to persist. Assuming a continuation of current trends in this realm
does not seem reasonable.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This thesis has strong implications for crafters of U.S. foreign policy. Promotion of
democracy abroad is both a clearly stated goal of U.S. foreign policy and one that has in recent
years received considerable attention and support from policy makers. 199 The strong likelihood
that the Internet and global networking and communication technologies in general are a
strong, statistically significant factor in the facilitation of democratization presents a wide range
ofnew options for U.S. policy makers. Promotion of the Internet may indeed be an effective
manner in which to promote democracy.
Such a democracy assistance program could take on a multitude of different forms,
most of which would have no resemblance to any form of "democracy promotion" but would
more likely be construed as technological or developmental assistance. A democracy
assistance program designed solely to promote the expansion of and access to the Internet
would yield several unique advantages:
199 Thomas Carothers, "Democracy," Foreign Policy (summer 1997): 11, and Paula R. Newberg and Thomas
Carothers. "Aiding—and Defining—Democracy," World Policy Journal (spring 19%): 97.
88
(1) As the world leader in information technologies, such a program would serve the
dual purpose of promoting democracy while boosting the sales in the information technology
sectors of the U.S. economy.
(2) Current perceptual problems associated with U.S. democracy assistance programs
(e.g. that specific political agendas are being advanced, or that local desires and concerns are
not being effectively addressed, etc.) may be alleviated. It is likely that Internet promotion may
be more likely to be viewed as a politically neutral and more palatable form of assistance.
(3) Such an assistance program would be much more clearly in the immediate
economic interest of the receiving state. Therefore, the resources, attention and effort applied
to the program by the receiving state would likely be greater than under traditional democracy
assistance programs.
(4) Unlike traditional forms of democracy assistance, Internet promotion is more likely
to be an acceptable program to a strong authoritarian state much earlier in the transition
process
—
possibly even prior to authoritarian leaders believing that a democratic transition is
even possible much less likely.
At a minimum, the issues raised in this thesis call for greater in-depth research into the
potential causal relationship between Internet connectivity and democracy. Given the high
level of attention that democracy studies have received in the existing literature, it is imperative
that a more detailed examination of this phenomenon be conducted. On the policy making
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